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Article
Courtroom Demeanor: The Theater of the
Courtroom
Laurie L. Levensont
All the world's a stage,
And all the men and women merely players:
They have their exits and their entrances;
And one man in his time plays many parts,
His acts being seven ages.1
What is it that we want the American criminal courtroom
to be? This is one of the fundamental questions facing our criin-
inal justice system today. Although we have constructed an
elaborate system of evidentiary rules and courtroom proce-
dures, an American criminal trial is much more than a mere
sum of its evidentiary parts. Rather, it is a theater in which the
various courtroom actors play out the guilt or innocence of the
defendant for the trier of fact to assess.2
t Professor of Law, William M. Rains Fellow and Director of the Center
for Ethical Advocacy, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. This Article is based
upon work and inspiration from my dear friend and former student, Kelly
White. I am very grateful for the insights of my colleagues during the Loyola
Workshop program. A special thank you to Victor Gold, David Leonard, Sa-
muel Pillsbury, Marcy Strauss, and Peter Tiersma for reviewing early drafts of
this work. Finally, this work would not have been possible without the invalu-
able help of my research assistants, Jeffrey Jensen, Krista Kyle, Emil Petros-
sian, Reid Jason, William Smyth, Lindsay Meurs, and Mary Gordon. Copy-
right © 2008 by Laurie L. Levenson.
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, As You LIKE IT act 2, sc. 7, at 622 (Shakes-
peare Head Press ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1938) (1623).
2. See Peter W. Murphy, "There's No Business Like... ?" Some Thoughts
on the Ethics of Acting in the Courtroom, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 111, 111 (2002)
(arguing that there is "undeniably a close relationship" between a courtroom
and a theater). Recognizing that the courtroom is like a theater, practitioners
are often instructed on how to act effectively in the courtroom. See, e.g., Do-
nald B. Fiedler, Acting Effectively in Court: Using Dramatic Techniques,
CHAMPION, July 2001, at 18, 19-23. Moreover, jurors often view the courtroom
as a theater, as one of the jurors in the O.J. Simpson murder trial indicated:
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One view of the courtroom is that of a controlled laboratory
in which the science of the law is performed. Under this model,
attorneys present evidence, the judge supervises for quality
control, and the jurors give the results of the experiment; there
is little room for emotions or actions whose impact cannot be
predicted. A trial is simply the sum of the parties' formal evi-
dence: eyewitness testimony, exhibits, and stipulations. Nei-
ther the words of counsel, nor the mannerisms of the defendant
off the stand, nor the reaction of the gallery affects the outcome
of a case.
Yet, as any experienced trial lawyer knows, this sanitized
venue for trials is a fantasy. In reality, trials often take on a life
of their own, and the outcome of the case is affected by many
factors that are not technically evidence: the quality of the law-
yers' presentations, 3 the appearance and reaction of the defen-
dant in the courtroom, 4 and even the presence of the victim's
The whole thing with those closing arguments was I felt it was all a
script. Everybody had his or her little script. I hated it because at
that point you're supposed to be tying in all the evidence and tying in
everything. So you're sitting there and trying to just focus on the is-
sues and here they are, Marcia Clark, the woe-is-me ... trying to get
the tear thing. And Johnnie Cochran is going on about Proverbs and
this, that, and the other, and the hat routine and "if it doesn't fit, you
must acquit."
GILBERT GEIS & LEIGH B. BIENEN, CRIMES OF THE CENTURY 187 (1998).
3. My colleague, Victor Gold, has written one of the seminal articles on
the effects of lawyers' advocacy in the courtroom. See Victor Gold, Covert Ad-
vocacy: Reflections on the Use of Psychological Persuasion Techniques in the
Courtroom, 65 N.C. L. REV. 481, 497-509 (1987) (describing how the erosion of
jury independence can prevent the jury from fulfilling its proper role in our
system of justice); see also William M. O'Barr & John M. Conley, When a Juror
Watches a Lawyer, BARRISTER, Summer 1976, at 8, 9-11 (summarizing the
findings of an experiment on the effectiveness of "power language" in the cour-
troom); Michelle Pan, Strategy or Stratagem: The Use of Improper Psychologi-
cal Tactics by Trial Attorneys to Persuade Jurors, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 259, 261-
63 (2005) (recognizing the effectiveness of lawyers' "psychological tactics" on
jurors, and questioning the propriety of such tactics). The focus of this Article,
however, is not the nonverbal communication of lawyers, but rather defen-
dants' nonverbal communication and its impact on juries.
4. For an explanation of how defense counsel should present and interact
with their clients in the courtroom, see LAWRENCE J. SMITH & LORETTA A.
MALANDRO, COURTROOM COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES §§ 1.37-.38, at 71-78
(1985) (advising attorneys on how to do everything from touching their clients
to show psychological closeness, to projecting "likability and approachability"
in the courtroom). As Smith and Malandro explain, jurors act like "detectives,"
looking for any clues, on or off the witness stand, to assist them in deciding the
outcome of a case. Id. § 1.49, at 90. For instance, in one case, post-trial jury
interviews revealed that jurors' observations of the oft-changing color of the
2008] THE THEATER OF THE COURTROOM 575
representatives. 5 As Clarence Darrow once said, "[jiurymen
seldom convict a person they like, or acquit one that they dis-
like. The main work of a trial lawyer is to make a jury like his
client, or, at least to feel sympathy for him; facts regarding the
crime are relatively unimportant."6 Under this second model,
the courtroom is viewed as a theater in which the parties act
out a human drama and the jury provides the conclusion. 7
Formal evidence continues to play an important role, but other
factors that constitute nonevidence, such as the defendant's
demeanor off the stand, may affect the outcome of a case.8 For
the most part, courts trust jurors to evaluate this nonevidence
and use it in an appropriate manner in reaching their verdicts.9
Rather than deciding which model of a criminal trial we
ought to have, we profess to require jurors to rely only on "evi-
dence" in deciding cases; we look the other way to the reality
that jurors do in fact consider a defendant's nontestimonial
demeanor in their decisions. While a defendant sits in court,
exercising his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses
against him, 10 he is at center stage and on display for the jury.
Jurors scrutinize his every move, attaching deep importance to
a quick glance or a passing remark-details a nonjuror might
consider insignificant.' High-profile criminal trials show that
plaintiff's toenail polish during the trial had as much or greater impact on the
jurors as the testimony of any witness. Id.
5. Expert jury consultants such as Dr. Jo-Ellan Dimitrius report that ju-
rors consider all of the dynamics of the courtroom in reaching a verdict. See
John Spano, Weller's Absence Plays Uncertain Role in Trial, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
9, 2006, at B5, available at 2006 WLNR 17440608 ("The courtroom becomes
the home for the jury .... They look and watch everyone who walks into their
home-the defendant, the judge, or someone in the audience. They make as-
sumptions based on their interaction with people in the courtroom." (quoting
Dr. Jo-Ellan Dimitrius) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The extent to
which jurors consider the demeanor of third parties in the courtroom is taking
on additional importance as victims are being given additional rights. See Tre-
sa Baldas, Victims Ascendant, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 19, 2007, at 1 (discussing the
potential effect of amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure on
prosecutors' decisions to put a "grieving relative" on the stand).
6. VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 131 (1986)
(quoting EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND & DONALD R. CRESSEY, PRINCIPLES OF CRI-
MINOLOGY 442 (7th ed. 1966)).
7. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
8. See infra Part I.B.
9. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
10. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
11. HAZEL THORNTON, HUNG JURY: THE DIARY OF A MENENDEZ JUROR
46-47 (1995) (recounting one juror's remarks that she attached "great signific-
ance" to things that a nonjuror might not even notice).
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jurors use a defendant's courtroom demeanor to determine his
sincerity and culpability. 12 The impression that the defendant
makes on the jury can thus have an enormous impact on the
outcome of the trial.13
As a society, we are "hard-wired" to judge people based on
their appearances; the same holds true in the courtroom. 14
Consequently, defense lawyers try to use appearances to their
advantage. 15 They adjust their own language, dress, and over-
all courtroom style to please the jury,' 6 and attempt to change
their clients' looks as well.17 Criminal defense guides encourage
client makeovers-each defendant needs the right outfit, a per-
fect hairstyle, and lessons on appropriate courtroom behavior.' 8
What the criminal justice system needs now more than ev-
er is an honest look at the dynamics of criminal trials so that
courts can make a conscious decision as to how much extrajudi-
cial information triers of fact should be allowed to consider. If
jurors consciously or unconsciously consider the defendant's
12. Among the trials discussed in this Article are those of Lorena Bobbitt,
Erik and Lyle Menendez, and Timothy McVeigh.
13. This Article focuses on the impact of a defendant's appearance and
demeanor on jurors. Of course, there is also the issue of whether such factors
affect judges' decisions, including those at sentencing. For more information
on this topic, see William T. Pizzi et al., Discrimination in Sentencing on the
Basis of Afrocentric Features, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 327, 348-51 (2005) (ana-
lyzing whether race impacts the sentences that defendants receive).
14. See, e.g., SMITH & MALANDRO, supra note 4, § 1.90, at 148-54 (discuss-
ing studies in which the social attractiveness of the defendant was found to
have a measurable impact on the jury); David L. Wiley, Beauty and the Beast:
Physical Appearance Discrimination in American Criminal Trials, 27 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 193, 211-12 (1995) ("Research suggests that people viewed as fa-
cially unattractive are more likely to be perceived as criminal than are facially
attractive persons."); see also Michael Searcy et al., Communication in the
Courtroom and the 'Appearance" of Justice, in APPLICATIONS OF NONVERBAL
COMMUNICATION 41, 41-42 (Ronald E. Riggio & Robert S. Feldman eds., 2005)
(contending that verbal and nonverbal behavior that may be interpreted in
one way if it occurs outside the courtroom is likely to convey a different im-
pression inside the courtroom).
15. See, e.g., Julie Hinds, Dressing for a Hoped-For Success, USA TODAY,
Jan. 12, 1994, at 3A (noting the various ways in which consultants for both
Lorena and John Bobbitt attempted to sculpt their clients' appearances to
their respective advantages at trial).
16. Gold, supra note 3, at 483.
17. See F. LEE BAILEY & KENNETH J. FISHMAN, CRIMINAL TRIAL TECH.
NIQUES §§ 41, 44 (1994) (providing advice on "Successful Courtroom Dressing"
and the proper body language and appearance for the "Defendant as a Wit-
ness").
18. See id.; CRIMINAL DEFENSE TECHNIQUES §§ 1A.04-.06 (Liliana Perillo
& Juliet Turner eds., 1998).
[92:573
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nontestimonial demeanor and appearance in court,19 should
there be specific instructions on how juries may treat such in-
formation? Are such instructions likely to be effective? Should
we allow lawyers to comment on that demeanor or appearance
so that jurors can be directed as to how to consider such infor-
mation during their deliberations?
The current approach of many courts is unsatisfactory.
Judges have been lulled into believing that so long as they fol-
low the dictated rules of evidence and procedure, the trials they
supervise will lead to the correct result.20 But, criminal trials
are more than just "who dunnit?" They are morality plays that
add to the equation the questions of whether the defendant de-
serves to be punished and whether punishing that person
serves society's interests. To answer those questions, we may
need to look beyond the witness box and openly recognize and
guide the jury on how to deal with the theater of the courtroom.
The first part of this Article examines the evolution of the
modern criminal jury trial and the role of demeanor in criminal
cases. While in the past, the free-flowing dynamic of a jury trial
allowed jurors to consider a defendant's demeanor in deciding
cases, the current system, with its strict rules of evidence and
procedure, is less accommodating. Part II then focuses on the
reality of what is happening today and how defendants' cour-
troom demeanor off the witness stand is likely to have an im-
pact on the outcome of the case. It provides specific examples of
how courtroom demeanor is impacting both high-profile and
more routine cases in the criminal justice system. While no
19. The difference between a defendant's demeanor and appearance is
that the former refers to how a person acts, consciously or not, whereas the
latter does not involve an action component. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLE-
GIATE DICTIONARY 60, 331 (11th ed. 2003) (defining "appearance" as an "out-
ward aspect" or "look," while defining "demeanor" as "behavior toward oth-
ers"). A person's appearance may become evidence in a case, for example,
when it forms the basis for identification. Demeanor, as a form of nonverbal
communication, can be used throughout a trial to convey information to the
jury without the person ever testifying. For a linguistic analysis of "nonverbal"
communication, see Peter Meijes Tiersma, The Judge as Linguist, 27 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 269, 275-79 (1993).
20. Even those researchers who recognize that jurors go beyond the evi-
dence to construct a "story" of the events based upon their own experiences or
pretrial publicity have failed to address the effect of a defendant's demeanor
on jurors. See, e.g., NORMAN J. FINKEL, COMMONSENSE JUSTICE: JURORS' No-
TIONS OF THE LAW 72 (1995) (listing the "extralegal factors" jurors consider as
including evidence, the defendant's attractiveness, prejudicial statements, le-
gally irrelevant information, and jurors' prior knowledge, but failing to include
the defendant's demeanor).
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scientific studies have quantified the impact of demeanor evi-
dence, its effect is undeniable. 21 Part III then discusses the in-
consistent approaches that courts have taken on the issue of
whether courtroom demeanor should be openly recognized in
court and should be the subject of comment by the parties and
counsel. As discussed, there is a significant split in how courts
address this issue. Finally, Part IV of this Article analyzes
whether it makes sense, given the role of today's criminal jury
trial, to consider a defendant's demeanor as evidence and to al-
low the lawyers to comment on it. If, as this Article suggests,
extreme dangers exist in allowing jurors to decide cases based
on defendants' appearances and demeanors off the witness
stand, then jury instructions should be used in every case to
counter jurors' natural instinct to judge a defendant by his
looks and mannerisms. Accordingly, this Article ends by pro-
posing an instruction that generally directs jurors not to rely on
demeanor evidence in their deliberations. For those rare cases
where a defendant's nontestifying demeanor becomes relevant,
this Article proposes an alternative instruction cautioning ju-
rors regarding the use of such evidence.
I. THE DYNAMICS OF THE MODERN COURTROOM
Jurymen are to see with their own eyes,
to hear with their own ears, and to make use of their
own consciences and understandings, in judging of the lives,
liberties or estates of their fellow subjects.22
The modern jury trial takes a fairly restrictive view of
what constitutes evidence. As explained later, defendants his-
torically played a much more dynamic role in the courtroom
and jurors had broader leeway in deciding how they would
reach their verdict.23 However, as a result of efforts in the mid-
twentieth-century to standardize court procedures with rules of
21. Although specific studies quantifying how quickly jurors form an opi-
nion regarding defendants do not exist, Smith and Malandro posit that when
it comes to trial counsel, "[j]urors form their initial impressions during the
first four minutes. Their assessment is based primarily on visual perceptions.
They tend to accept the visual and nonverbal cues while rejecting the verbal
cues." SMITH & MALANDRO, supra note 4, § 5.93, at 538. Accordingly, there is
little reason to believe that the nonverbal cues of a defendant have any less
impact on the jurors than those of the attorneys.
22. HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 6, at 35 (quoting Andrew Hamilton, de-
fense counsel to John Peter Zenger in Zenger's famous trial for seditious libel
in 1735). For a thorough discussion of the Zenger trial, see id. at 32-35.
23. See infra Part I.C.
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evidence and rules of procedure, defendants are expected to
take a more limited role and cases are expected to be decided
on "evidence," rather than the drama of the courtroom. 24
This Part discusses the history of the role of defendants in
the courtroom. Section A begins with our current approach of
using rules of evidence to guide jurors in evaluating their cases.
Section B, however, demonstrates the true dynamic of the cour-
troom, noting that jurors inevitably go beyond narrow defini-
tions of evidence by routinely relying on defendants' and spec-
tators' nonverbal cues. Finally, Section C presents the history
of defendants' participation in the courtroom. Prior to our cur-
rent approach to trials, defendants would play a more active
role in the courtroom. Jurors had an opportunity to evaluate
the defendant by more than the evidence presented at trial.
A. WHAT Is "EVIDENCE"?
Today, jurors are instructed to reach a verdict based only
on admissible evidence, which is limited to certain types of in-
formation ordinarily presented from the witness stand.25 Such
evidence may include (1) witness testimony, 26 (2) writings, 27 (3)
recordings, 28 (4) photographs, 29 and (5) physical evidence. 30
Judges also instruct jurors not to consider an attorney's ques-
tions or arguments as evidence. 31 However, jurors are not given
any direction on how to consider a defendant's demeanor.
24. See infra Part I.A.
25. Admissible evidence only includes evidence that is relevant. See FED.
R. EVID. 402. Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the exis-
tence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Id. R. 401. Relevant
evidence may be excluded, however, "if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or mis-
leading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or need-
less presentation of cumulative evidence." Id. R. 403.
26. See id. R. 701-03 (regulating testimony by lay and expert witnesses).
27. See id. R. 612 (permitting the admission of writings to refresh a wit-
ness's memory); id. R. 1006 (allowing evidence to be presented in summary
form at trial if it cannot be conveniently examined in court).
28. See id. R. 1006.
29. See id.
30. See id. R. 412 (permitting evidence to show that a person other than
the accused was the source of the physical evidence).
31. See California Jury Instructions: Criminal [CALJIC] § 1.02 (2007); see
also 1 HOWARD G. LEVENTHAL, CHARGES TO THE JURY AND REQUESTS TO
CHARGE IN A CRIMINAL CASE § 4:76 (rev. ed. 1988) ("Nor are you to consider or
give any weight at all to statements or opinions of counsel: they are not wit-
nesses, and their statements, arguments and opinions do not constitute evi-
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Under the current approach, the court controls what in-
formation the jurors will allegedly use in reaching their deci-
sion. Elaborate rules of evidence were established in England
as far back as 1700 to try to rein in the decision making of the
jury.32 More recently, Congress and the courts adopted the
Federal Rules of Evidence in 197533 to try to create consistency
in trials.34
For example, one of the areas of evidence that has always
concerned the courts is to what extent character evidence
should be admissible to prove a defendant's culpability.35 In
general, the rule is that a defendant's guilt should be based
upon his conduct, not his character, and the rules traditionally
limit to what extent character evidence is admissible. 36 The
drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence stated in the advisory
committee's note the following principles behind the general
rule against character evidence:
Character evidence is of slight probative, value and may be very pre-
judicial. It tends to distract the trier of fact from the main question of
what actually happened on the particular occasion. It subtly permits
the trier of fact to reward the good man and to punish the bad man
dence."); KEVIN F. O'MALLEY ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUC-
TIONS: CIVIL § 103.01, at 108 (5th ed. 2000) (summarizing the Fifth Circuit's
general jury instructions for charge, which require the judge to state that,
"[s]tatements and arguments of the attorneys are not evidence and are not in-
structions on the law").
32. LLOYD E. MOORE, THE JURY: TOOL OF KINGS, PALLADIUM OF LIBERTY
70 (2d ed. 1988).
33. An Act to Establish Rules of Evidence for Certain Courts and Pro-
ceedings, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
34. FED. R. EVID. 102 (stating that the Federal Rules of Evidence aim to
regulate the admission of evidence and promote "the end that the trust may be
ascertained and proceedings justly determined").
35. In the early trials of the seventeenth century, "it was not considered
irregular to call witnesses to prove a prisoner's bad character in order to raise
a presumption of his guilt." JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY
CRIMINAL TRIAL 190-91 (2003) (quoting 1 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HIS-
TORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 368 (London, MacMillan 1883)) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). For nearly the last three hundred years,
however, courts have been concerned about allowing a defendant to be tried on
his character, and have thus put limitations on the use of character evidence.
See, e.g., Jason M. Brauser, Comment, Intrinsic or Extrinsic?: The Confusing
Distinction Between Inextricably Intertwined Evidence and Other Crimes Evi-
dence Under Rule 404(b), 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1582, 1583 (1994).
36. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404. A notable exception to this rule is the ad-
missibility of character evidence in cases alleging sexual offenses. In these sit-
uations, the general rule is that evidence of a defendant's past activities that
shows he has a propensity to commit the alleged sexual acts is admissible. See
id. R. 413(a).
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because of their respective characters despite what the evidence in
the case shows actually happened.37
Thus, these evidentiary rules assume that by eliminating
character evidence from the courtroom, jurors will decide the
case based solely on the admissible evidence presented. Under
this view, a trial is nothing more than the sum of its eviden-
tiary parts. Jurors are expected to draw rational conclusions
from the evidence they are allowed to receive and reach a deci-
sion accordingly. The reality, however, is quite different.
B. THE REAL COURTROOM DYNAMIC
Jurors are not machines and courtrooms are not laborato-
ries. Laboratories are controlled environments in which trial
and error are accepted protocol. Even with rules of evidence,
trials do not provide the same type of controlled, sterile envi-
ronment. Moreover, because a person's liberty is at stake, the
trial-and-error approach to judgments is unacceptable.
Rather, as we have learned from psychologists and sociolo-
gists, the courtroom presents a dynamic that is more akin to,
but not precisely like, a theater.3 8 Jurors use all of their senses,
including their intuition, to reach their verdicts. 39 "In the cour-
37. Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D.
183, 221 (1973) (quoting Tentative Recommendation of the California Law Re-
vision Commission Relating to the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 6 CAL. L. REVI-
SION COMM'N REPS. RECOMMENDATIONS & STUD. 615 (1964)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
38. See Milner S. Ball, The Play's the Thing: An Unscientific Reflection on
Courts Under the Rubric of Theater, 28 STAN. L. REV. 81, 81-83 (1975).
39. Of course, we already allow jurors to use these cues in deciding on the
credibility of witnesses, even though it is difficult to determine the validity of
nonverbal cues. See Robert K. Bothwell & Mehri Jalil, The Credibility of Nerv-
ous Witnesses, 7 J. SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 581, 583-85 (1992) (examin-
ing the effect of witness nervousness on perceptions of witness credibility and
accuracy, and finding that "observer-based ratings of witness nervousness
were not significantly correlated with actual witness identification [or testi-
monial] accuracy"); David Dryden Henningsen et al., Pattern Violations and
Perceptions of Deception, 13 COMM. REP. 1, 8-9 (2000) (analyzing the manner
in which nonverbal cues are perceived as deceptive by jurors, and suggesting
that individuals may interpret deceptiveness based less on the mere presence
of nonverbal cues, and more on a pattern of nonverbal cues). Moreover, law
enforcement officers use nonverbal indicators to assess the credibility of their
suspects' statements. See John E. Hocking & Dale G. Leathers, Nonverbal In-
dicators of Deception: A New Theoretical Perspective, 47 COMM. MONOGRAPHS
119, 123-24 (1980) (examining bodily movement, facial nervousness, and vocal
nervousness). Even judges use physical cues to decide the honesty and disho-
nesty of statements. See James A. Forrest & Robert S. Feldman, Detecting De-
ception and Judge's Involvement: Lower Task Involvement Leads to Better Lie
Detection, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 118, 122-24 (2000). This
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troom, nonverbal communication subtly affects the entire pro-
ceedings of a trial."40 Yet, because courtrooms are not for mere
entertainment or education, we expect that the verdict in the
courtroom will be based on concrete, verifiable information and
not impressions of the parties' personalities.
We currently allow aspects of both models to define our
criminal courtrooms. Formal procedures and evidentiary rules
attempt to create a controlled atmosphere for decision making.
Nonetheless, the drama of each trial also impacts decisions by
jurors.
The nontestimonial communications that affect jurors' de-
cisions range from facial expressions, gestures, body move-
ments, and smells to paralanguage. 41 Even when the defendant
is not testifying, jurors will watch him or her at the counsel ta-
ble. Several studies have concluded that a defendant's physical
attractiveness (or lack thereof) can influence a jury's verdict.4 2
A defendant's fidgeting may also impact the jurors' decisions. 43
Article focuses on whether the behavioral and demeanor cues from a defen-
dant should be used in deciding that person's guilt or innocence.
40. Elizabeth A. LeVan, Nonverbal Communication in the Courtroom: At-
torney Beware, L. & PSYCHOL. REV., Spring 1984, at 83, 83.
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERI-
CAN JURY ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 100-03 (1988) ("When it
comes to juries ... if the evidence is ambiguous, people are more likely to vote
guilty when the accused is unattractive and the victim is attractive than the
other way around."); Michael G. Efran, The Effect of Physical Appearance on
the Judgment of Guilt, Interpersonal Attraction, and Severity of Recommended
Punishment in a Simulated Jury Task, 8 J. RES. PERSONALITY 45, 45-52
(1974) (describing a study on the physical attractiveness of defendants); Le-
Van, supra note 40, at 91-94 ("[P]hysical attractiveness could have an impact
on jury decision making."); see also Gloria Leventhal & Ronald Krate, Physical
Attractiveness and Severity of Sentencing, 40 PSYCHOL. REP. 315, 315-17
(1977) (finding in a jury simulation that attractive defendants receive more
lenient sentencing); Lee Ross & Donna Shestowsky, Contemporary Psycholo-
gy's Challenges to Legal Theory and Practice, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1081, 1083 n.9
(2003) (listing various studies on how "defendant characteristics" bias judges
and juries). But see Jennifer F. Orleans & Michael B. Gurtman, Effects of
Physical Attractiveness and Remorse on Evaluations of Transgressors, 6 ACAD.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 49, 53-54 (1984) (suggesting that the physical attractiveness
of a witness may have less influence where the witness is male and the ob-
server is female).
43. One psychological study defined "fidgeting" as "engaging in actions
that are peripheral or nonessential to ongoing focal tasks or events." Albert
Mehrabian & Shari L. Friedman, An Analysis of Fidgeting and Associated In-
dividual Differences, 54 J. PERSONALITY 406, 406 (1986). Prominent lawyers
have rejected the claim that fidgeting is a sign of guilt. As the renowned Da-
niel Webster proclaimed, "[m]iserable, miserable, indeed, is the reasoning
[92:573
2008] THE THEATER OF THE COURTROOM 583
Although it is difficult to know how a particular juror will in-
terpret a defendant's fidgeting, many studies correlate fidget-
ing with a person's anxious or hostile nature.44 Hand move-
ments can also affect jurors' perceptions of the defendant and
the case. 45 People from different cultures tend to interpret hand
movements differently. For example, in some cultures, hand
movements are part and parcel of normal communication and
carry with them coded messages. 46 Other observers are less
comfortable with hand movements and will read them diffe-
rently. 47 Even a defendant's smile can influence jurors, even
though scientific studies have shown that people are not par-
ticularly good at distinguishing between a sincere and an insin-
cere smile. 48 Finally, whether a person has eye contact with ju-
rors can affect their decisions. Lack of eye contact is often read
as deception, even though it might be the product of shyness or
fear. 49
Up to now, the courts have given very little attention to the
question of how the criminal justice system should deal with
jurors' perceptions of a defendant's demeanor in court. 50 Only
in the rare situations where a defendant is considered incompe-
tent for trial or overly medicated do the courts tend to get in-
volved in controlling the jury's perception of the defendant's
demeanor. 51
which would infer any man's guilt from his agitation." HENRY HARDWICKE,
THE ART OF WINNING CASES 155 (Albany, Banks & Co. 1899).
44. Mehrabian & Friedman, supra note 43, at 427-28 ("[F]idgeting ten-
dency did relate to trait anxiety, hyperactivity, and some hostility measures.").
45. See generally Paul Ekman & Wallace V. Friesen, Hand Movements, 22
J. COMM. 353, 355-71 (1972) (classifying and describing different types of
hand movements).
46. Id. at 357-58, 364-67.
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., Jinni A. Harrigan & Kristy T. Taing, Fooled by a Smile: De-
tecting Anxiety in Others, 21 J. NONVERBAL BEHAV. 203, 216 (1997) (finding
that insincere smiles that are clearly visible to an observer may mask, and
thereby cause the observer to fail to notice, a person's anxiety).
49. Cf. Paul Ekman & Wallace V. Friesen, Nonverbal Leakage and Clues
to Deception, 32 PSYCHIATRY 88, 97 (1969) ("Eye-contacts ... which deviate in
duration or frequency from the norm for a given social interaction can provide
important deception clues ....").
50. Interestingly, there has been some focus on how a defendant's demea-
nor is changed by videoconferencing. The defendant's demeanor is a concern
when deciding whether to allow videotaped appearances of defendants. See
Anne Bowen Poulin, Criminal Justice and Videoconferencing Technology: The
Remote Defendant, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1089, 1124-27 (2004).
51. See Vickie L. Feeman, Note, Reassessing Forced Medication of Crimi-
nal Defendants in Light of Riggins v. Nevada, 35 B.C. L. REV. 681, 681, 689-90
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However, courts have recognized that appearances and
events in the courtroom, even if not evidence, can affect the ju-
rors' verdicts. For example, in Estelle v. Williams, the Supreme
Court considered "whether an accused who is compelled to wear
identifiable prison clothing at his trial by a jury is denied due
process or equal protection of the laws."52 The Court held that
just the defendant's appearance in the courtroom in prison
clothes could undermine the fairness of the trial.53 Obviously,
the defendant's apparel is not evidence; nonetheless, the Court
recognized that it could have a detrimental impact on the jury's
decision-making process.
Similarly, the Supreme Court has held that a defendant
may not be shackled in a courtroom unless there are compelling
security interests.54 Although the shackles are not "evidence" in
the case, they can nevertheless affect the jurors' verdict. The
courts worried that the very presence of the shackles changed
the dynamic of the courtroom from one in which the defendant
(1994) (describing the Court's concerns that a heavily medicated defendant
may have involuntary facial expressions, tremors, spasms, and other move-
ments that could affect the defendant's appearance and mannerisms in court).
52. 425 U.S. 501, 502 (1976). After an altercation between the defendant
and his former landlord, a Texas state court convicted Williams of assault with
intent to commit murder with malice. Id. at 502-03. Before going to trial, the
defendant asked an officer for civilian clothes to wear instead of the prison
garb, but was denied the change of clothes and attended trial in the prison is-
sue. Id. at 502. Neither the defendant nor his counsel raised an objection to
the clothing at trial. Id. The Court held that, while
the State cannot, consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, com-
pel an accused to stand trial before a jury while dressed in identifia-
ble prison clothes, the failure to make an objection to the court as to
being tried in such clothes, for whatever reason, is sufficient to negate
the presence of compulsion necessary to establish a constitutional vi-
olation.
Id. at 512-13.
53. Id.
54. Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 633 (2005). Carman Deck was con-
victed of robbing and shooting to death an elderly couple, and received a death
sentence. Id. at 624-25. The Missouri Supreme Court upheld his conviction,
but ordered a new sentencing hearing. Id. During the new sentencing hearing,
Deck was forced to wear leg irons, handcuffs, and a bellychain, to which his
counsel unsuccessfully objected three times. Id. Deck again received the death
sentence. Id. However, the United States Supreme Court overturned the death
sentence holding that unless specific circumstances, such as security concerns,
warrant shackling, "courts cannot routinely place defendants in shackles or
other physical restraints visible to the jury during the penalty phase of a capi-
tal proceeding." Id. at 633.
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is presumed innocent to one in which the defendant is viewed
by the jury as a safety risk and probably guilty. 55
More recently, the courts have tried to deal with the issue
of how apparel and reactions by spectators in the courtroom
can affect jury verdicts. For example, during the defendant's
trial in Carey v. Musladin, members of the victim's family sat
in the front row of the spectators' gallery wearing buttons dis-
playing the victim's image. 56 After the California Court of Ap-
peals refused to reverse Musladin's conviction because he had
failed to show actual or inherent prejudice from the victim's
family's actions, Musladin filed a petition for habeas relief.57
Although the district court denied Musladin's petition for ha-
beas relief, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed, finding that the spectators' courtroom conduct
was inherently prejudicial and that the state court ruling "was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court
of the United States."58 However, the Supreme Court left open
the question of what spectator conduct is egregious enough to
violate a defendant's right to a fair trial.59 Instead, Justice
Thomas, writing for the Court, reversed the Ninth Circuit on
procedural grounds because Musladin had not shown that the
state court's ruling was contrary to "clearly established federal
law."60
In fact, the Supreme Court has never ruled on whether
buttons worn by civilian spectators deny a defendant his right
to a fair trial. The closest the Court has come was in deciding
55. Id. at 633 ("The appearance of the offender during the penalty phase
in shackles, however, almost inevitably implies to a jury, as a matter of com-
mon sense, that court authorities consider the offender a danger to the com-
munity . . . [and] almost inevitably affects adversely the jury's perception of
the character of the defendant.").
56. 127 S. Ct. 649, 651-52 (2006).
57. Id. at 652.
58. Id. (citing Musladin v. Lamarque, 427 F.3d 653, 659-60 (9th Cir.
2005), vacated sub nom., Carey v. Musladin, 127 S. Ct. 649 (2006)). Under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, and
42 U.S.C.), an application for federal habeas relief cannot be granted unless
the defendant meets the threshold procedural requirement of showing that the
state court decision "involved an unreasonable application of clearly estab-
lished Federal law." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000).
59. Musladin, 127 S. Ct. at 651.
60. Id. at 650.
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Holbrook v. Flynn.61 In Flynn, four uniformed state troopers sat
in the spectators' seats immediately behind the defendant dur-
ing trial.62 Nevertheless, the Court held that the troopers' pres-
ence was not so inherently prejudicial that they denied the de-
fendant a fair trial.63 The test for whether spectators' actions
violate a defendant's right to a fair trial is "whether 'an unac-
ceptable risk is presented of impermissible factors coming into
play."' 64
Thus, the Court has opined that spectators' actions can vi-
olate a defendant's right to a fair trial, although it has not es-
tablished a firm test for when such a right is violated.65 The
Court has also not set forth guidelines as to when a defendant's
demeanor, or the prosecutor's comments on it, violate either the
defendant's right to a fair trial or the government's interest in
fair proceedings. At most, the Court has given the impression
that the courtroom is neither a sterile laboratory, nor an open
forum where spectators can rally for their cause. 66 For example,
in their Musladin concurrences, both Justices Anthony Kenne-
dy and David Souter noted that each courtroom will have its
own dynamic. 6 7 A certain amount of drama is part and parcel of
the trial atmosphere. Even spectator conduct can be tolerated
so long as it does not intimidate jurors into reaching a particu-
lar verdict. 68
61. 475 U.S. 560 (1986).
62. Id. at 562.
63. Id. at 571.
64. Id. at 570 (quoting Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 505 (1976)).
65. See Musladin, 127 S. Ct. at 651. Following the Musladin decision, The
New York Times called for courts to establish "uniform rules about what sort
of spectator actions are impermissible." Editorial, Lobbying the Jury, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 13, 2006, at A32.
66. In his majority opinion, Justice Thomas noted that the "lower courts
have diverged widely in their treatment of defendants' spectator-conduct
claims." Musladin, 127 S. Ct. at 654. While the courts have not permitted
courtroom demonstrations to convert trials into "sham" proceedings, they have
tolerated spectator conduct that does nothing more than convey support for
the victim. See id. at 653 n.2, 654.
67. See id. at 656-57 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 657-58 (Souter, J.,
concurring). Justices Kennedy and Souter also acknowledged that a certain
amount of spectator conduct can be expected and tolerated during a trial. See
id. at 656 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 658 (Souter, J., concurring). In Jus-
tice Souter's words, it is only when spectator conduct reaches "unacceptable"
levels that it violates a defendant's right to a fair trial. Id. at 658 (Souter, J.,
concurring).
68. Id. at 656 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The rule against a coercive or
intimidating atmosphere at trial exists because 'we are committed to a gov-
ernment of laws and not of men,' under which it is 'of the utmost importance
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Cognizant of the fact that jurors take in all aspects of the
courtroom proceedings, including spectator appearances and
demeanor, lower courts have sought to limit the extent to which
victims and supporters of victims may display their emotions
during a trial.69 Typically, courts are wary of displays of emo-
tion by a victim's family member or representative in the cour-
troom, and these displays are often suppressed. Crying mothers
of murder victims have been reprimanded for displaying too
much emotion in the courtroom, thereby potentially improperly
affecting the jurors' decisions. 70
The limitations on community spectators and the buttons
they wear are proof of the implicit recognition by the courts
that the courtroom dynamic can and does affect the outcome of
a case. Lawyers use their understanding of the theater of the
courtroom to help make their presentations more effective. 71
that the administration of justice be absolutely fair and orderly'...." (quoting
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 562 (1965))). For Justice Kennedy, the pre-
ferred atmosphere for court is one of "calm and dignity." Id. at 656.
69. See, e.g., Norris v. Risley, 918 F.2d 828, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1990) (find-
ing that spectators' buttons, which said "Women Against Rape," deprived the
defendant of a fair trial); Buckner v. State, 714 So. 2d 384, 389 (Fla. 1998) (re-
cognizing that, "[u]nder certain circumstances, prejudicial exhibition of emo-
tion may deprive a defendant of a fair trial," but holding that the brief show-
ing of a picture of the victim by a spectator was not sufficiently prejudicial to
change the outcome of the case).
70. See, e.g., People v. Chatman, 133 P.3d 534, 552 (Cal. 2006), cert. de-
nied, 127 S. Ct. 938 (2007) (providing an example of a judge who was willing to
force a witness to leave should she continue to have emotional outbursts on
the stand). Some judges go to extreme lengths to ensure that a victim's emo-
tional display does not unfairly bias a juror. For example, in a Florida case,
the judge warned the victims' mother not to cry in the courtroom, including on
the witness stand: "Warned by the judge that tears could trigger a mistrial, a
mother was stoic in front of a Florida jury ... as she relived the day she dis-
covered the bloodied bodies of her children." Emanuella Grinberg, Judge
Warns Victims' Mother Not to Cry on Stand, CNN.coM, Sept. 13, 2006, http://
www.cnn.com/2006fLAW/09/13/no.crying/index.html. In order to ensure that
the mother's testimony was sanitized enough, both sides agreed to let the
mother "give her testimony outside the presence of the jury and then play a
video of the testimony for the jury if it was deemed 'unemotional' enough." Id.
71. See Gold, supra note 3, at 494-97. Lawyers use a variety of techniques
to influence and persuade jurors. These techniques include scripting how the
lawyers and their clients dress, speak, and interact with others in the cour-
troom. See Pan, supra note 3, at 266-71. For example, a lawyer may come into
the courtroom wearing a flamboyant tie to capture the jurors' attention. Id. at
267. Lawyers script their examinations to use the most powerful, effective
language in front of the jury. Id. at 266. They may also attempt to influence
jurors by placing exhibits not admitted into evidence within jurors' line of
sight. Id. at 271. Jurors may even be influenced by the way in which a lawyer
arranges his material on the table. Neat organization indicates to the jury that
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For example, defense lawyers use a standard tactic of loading a
courtroom with spectators, hoping to distract the jurors from
focusing on the evidence in the courtroom.7 2 By packing the
courtroom audience with supporters, a lawyer can manipulate
the meaning that the jurors ascribe to the evidence.73
While the criminal justice system seeks to prohibit or at
least minimize certain types of nonevidence that may influence
jurors' decisions, it does not bar all aspects of interaction that
may impact a verdict. We are committed to live presentation of
the proceedings, with all the unpredictability that it includes.
Although not acknowledged in formal court opinions, "[1]ive
presentation may indicate something of the sources to which
decisionmakers may turn . . . First, live presentation may
shift attention from the rules of decision to the environment of
decision."74 We want jurors to realize that their decision is not a
judgment in the abstract; it will have an impact on numerous
individuals, especially the defendant. 75 Second, once the jurors
realize who will be impacted by their decisions, they can do a
better job of assessing the information they are receiving about
that individual.76 Jurors must rely on evidence, but their ob-
servations in the courtroom can help them test the inferences
they are willing to make from such evidence. Indeed, as the
next Section will show, courts historically have recognized the
role that the defendant's demeanor can play in the courtroom.
C. ROLE OF THE DEFENDANT IN THE COURTROOM: A HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE
The current approach to trials, with restrictive rules of
procedure and evidence, is of fairly recent vintage. The Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure did not become effective until
the attorney is prepared and under control. Paul Mark Sandler, Raising the
Bar: "Beware of Bow Ties and Diamonds in Court," DAILY REC. (Balt., Md.),
May 18, 2007, at 2B, available at http://www.shapirosher.com/news/
BowtiesandDiamondsinCourt.htm. Even a lawyer's movements in the cour-
troom can be used to communicate subliminal messages to the jury. A lawyer
who moves around during arguments may be perceived as more approachable
and credible than a lawyer who stands behind a lectern. Id. Finally, lawyers
also use eye contact and facial expressions to communicate with jurors. Id.
72. Gold, supra note 3, at 494-95 (citing Donald E. Vinson, Juries: Percep-
tion and the Decision-Making Process, TRIAL, Mar. 1982, at 52, 54); see Pan,
supra note 3, at 271.
73. Gold, supra note 3, at 494-95.
74. Ball, supra note 38, at 105.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 105-06.
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1946, 77 and the Federal Rules of Evidence were not adopted un-
til 1975.78 Prior to that time, a court had broad discretion in
governing what type of information jurors would use to reach
their decisions.7 9 While evidence still referred generally to the
testimony of witnesses or physical evidence, parties and specta-
tors in the courtroom played a more dynamic role.
Long before the current procedures for trials, a criminal
trial was a "lawyer-free" contest between citizen accusers and
citizen accused.8 0 Rather than formally presenting witnesses,
the victim and the accused engaged in a confrontational dialo-
gue about the circumstances of the alleged offense.8' The ac-
cused was disqualified from testifying, but his nontestifying
role in the courtroom ensured that his explanations and argu-
ments would be considered by the jury.8 2 Moreover, his role en-
sured that jurors would consider not just what was said in the
courtroom, but how it was presented, 83 including the demeanor
of the defendant in his adversarial role.
At the time of the colonies, cases still were being decided
on the basis of a defendant's appearance or gestures in the
courtroom.8 4 Thus, during the Salem Witch Trials, many de-
77. FED. R. CRIM. P. historical note. The rules were adopted by order of
the Supreme Court in 1944, were transmitted to Congress in 1945, and be-
came effective in 1946. Id.
78. FED. R. EVID. historical note. The rules were adopted by order of the
Supreme Court in 1972, were transmitted to Congress in 1973, and became
effective in 1975. Id. Until these rules took effect, courts relied on common law
rules of evidence. Mark D. Rosen, What Has Happened to the Common Law?-
Recent American Codifications, and Their Impact on Judicial Practice and the
Law's Subsequent Development, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 1119, 1123-24.
79. As described in Professor Lawrence M. Friedman's seminal work,
Crime and Punishment in American History, prior to the rules, juries were al-
lowed more leeway in what they considered for their verdict. LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 233-58 (1993).
"Witnesses apparently had a good deal of leeway to tell their stories uninter-
rupted; there was less fussing over minor points of evidence than would be
true today, less shadowboxing over rules of procedure; the judge's charge was
looser, freer, more colloquial, more tailored to the particular case." Id. at 237.
80. See LANGBEIN, supra note 35, at 253 ("The felony criminal trial re-
tained its lawyer-free character into the 1730s. Citizen accusers confronted the
accused in altercation-style trial. Prosecution counsel was virtually never
used; defense counsel was forbidden. The accused conducted his own defense,
as a running bicker with the accusers."). Langbein refers to these types of pro-
ceedings as "the 'accused speaks' trial[s]." Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 269-73.
83. Id. at 266-70.
84. Id. at 253-72.
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fendants were condemned based upon their appearance and
performance in the courtroom.8 5 Prior to the 1830s, criminal
trials generally began with a statement by the defendant not
under oath.8 6 "The prisoner's statement enabled the court to
hear the prisoner's version of events, and observe his demea-
nour, notwithstanding the prohibition on the prisoner giving
evidence."87 Jurors were expected to observe the defendant's
behavior in court and consider it in their decision making.88
One reason that defendants played a greater role in the
courtroom was that there was no right to be represented by
counsel.8 9 Defendants appeared pro se, and the strength of
their appearances, nontestimonial arguments, and overall con-
duct in the courtroom could persuade jurors that defendants
should not be convicted. 90 Thus, defendants could influence the
jurors' verdicts without even testifying.
The criminal trials of our past were less structured and
provided an opportunity for the jury to evaluate not merely the
evidence against the defendant, but also the defendant's char-
acter. 91 While verdicts were to be based on the evidence, they
also clearly represented a "judgment" regarding the defendant's
moral responsibility and prospects for a law-abiding future. 92
85. See, e.g., JANICE SCHUETZ, THE LOGIC OF WOMEN ON TRIAL: CASE
STUDIES OF POPULAR AMERICAN TRIALS 26-27 (1994). Defendants were also
required to touch an alleged victim of their witchcraft to see if the touch trig-
gered demonic fits. Id.
86. DAVID J.A. CAIRNS, ADVOCACY AND THE MAKING OF THE ADVERSARIAL
CRIMINAL TRIAL 1800-1865, at 49 (1998).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 78.
89. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 53 (3d ed.
2005) ("The early colonial years were not friendly years for lawyers. There
were few lawyers among the settlers. In some colonies, lawyers were distinctly
unwelcome ..... [For example], [i]n Pennsylvania, it was said, 'They have no
lawyers. Everyone is to tell his own case, or some friend for him... 'Tis a hap-
py country." (final omission in original)).
90. See, e.g., THOMAS ANDREW GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CON-
SCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY, 1200-1800,
at 174-75 (1985) (describing a case in which a pro se litigant successfully ar-
gued and persuaded the jury to find him not guilty).
91. Jurors could even play a role in establishing the defendant's character
by testifying during the very cases in which they sat as jurors. See LANGBEIN,
supra note 35, at 319-20.
92. Such judgments may also be the psychological remnants of trials by
ordeal in which a defendant's fate relied more on his physical reactions than
on the evidence presented against the defendant. See Stephan Landsman, A
Brief Survey of the Development of the Adversary System, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 713,
717-21 (1983) (recounting the history of trials by ordeal); Trisha Olson, Of
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Today's courtrooms operate under strict rules of procedure,
but they have not eliminated the practical impact of nontesti-
monial courtroom demeanor on juries. As the next Section of
this Article demonstrates, courtroom demeanor continues to
play an important, albeit sub silentio role, in criminal trials.
The disconnect between our modern rules of procedure and evi-
dence, and the reality of how demeanor impacts a trial, has
caused confusion and inconsistency in how courts handle non-
testifying demeanor evidence.
II. COURTROOM DEMEANOR93
Tim McVeigh just sat there somberly, almost emotionless, throughout the tri-
al-even today.... He just looked at us, and we looked at him, each one of us.9 4
For me, a big part of it was at the end, the verdict-no emotion, no anything.
That spoke a thousand words.9 5
You don't want him to look guilty. It's all about communicating a relaxed, con-
fident air .... It's meant to say that no matter what the prosecution has, I'm
innocent.96
I was fascinated by... how important [Scott Peterson's] demeanor in the cour-
troom was .... [Jurors shouldn't consider it, but] they are allowed to look at the
defendant.97
Enchantment: The Passing of the Ordeals and the Rise of the Jury Trial, 50
SYRACUSE L. REV. 109, 115-22 (2000) (same).
93. While "demeanor" most frequently refers to a testifying witness's fa-
cial expressions and body language, some courts have recognized that the term
also applies to the conduct, expression, and reactions of nonwitnesses sitting
in the courtroom. See, e.g., United States v. Schipani, 293 F. Supp. 156, 163
(E.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 414 F.2d 1262 (2d Cir. 1969).
94. Richard A. Serrano, McVeigh Gets Death, L.A. TIMES, June 14, 1997,
at Al (discussing the comments of a juror following the criminal trial of Timo-
thy McVeigh) (internal quotation marks omitted).
95. Jurors: Evidence, Peterson's Demeanor "Spoke for Itself," CNN.CoM,
Dec. 14, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/12/13/jury.reax/index.html (dis-
cussing the comments of a juror who pointed to Scott Peterson's demeanor in
the courtroom as affecting her decision to find him guilty of murdering his
wife) (internal quotation marks omitted).
96. Mark Katches, Potential Panelists See a Confident, Smiling Defen-
dant, DAILY NEWS (L.A.), Sept. 28, 1994, at N8, available at 1994 WLNR
1361430 (quoting Erwin Chemerinsky on the first week of voir dire in O.J.
Simpson's criminal trial) (internal quotation marks omitted).
97. American Morning: Verdict in for Scott Peterson (CNN television
broadcast Dec. 14, 2004) (LEXIS transcript no. 121404CN.V74) (quoting a
statement from Jeffrey Toobin, CNN Senior Legal Analyst).
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Based on interviews with jurors in high-profile cases, it is
undeniable that a defendant's demeanor and appearance in the
courtroom continue to influence jurors' decisions. Although de-
meanor impacts both high-profile and routine cases, the high
visibility cases provide the starkest evidence that jurors readily
consider all conduct in the courtroom, not just the testimony of
witnesses, in reaching their decision.
Consider the following cases: Lorena Bobbitt-the Virginia
woman charged with maliciously wounding her sleeping hus-
band by cutting off his penis;98 Erik and Lyle Menendez-the
two brothers convicted of murdering their parents who hung
the jury in their first trial by appearing as preppy and youthful
as possible;99 Timothy McVeigh-the bomber of the Alfred P.
Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, who
demonstrated no emotion during his trial for murdering 168
men, women, and children in the bloodiest act of domestic ter-
rorism in American history;100 and, Joseph Danks, who tried to
stab his defense counsel in front of the jury during the death
penalty phase of his murder trial.10 1
In Bobbitt's trial, the defense's strategy was for Bobbitt to
appear as small and helpless in the courtroom as possible in
order to support her defense that she was incapable of being
the aggressor against her "burly, ex-Marine husband."10 2 Tech-
nically, Bobbitt's manner of dress, her innocent looks at counsel
table, and her cowering when her husband appeared were not
98. See Lorena Bobbit Trial: Day 3, pt. 10 (CNN television broadcast Jan.
12, 1994) (LEXIS transcript no. 582-3); see also David Margolick, Witnesses
Say Mutilated Man Often Hit Wife, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1994, at A10 (describ-
ing the courtroom proceedings on the second day of trial).
99. See Ann W. O'Neill & Nicholas Riccardi, Menendez Brothers Sentenced
to Life for Killing Parents, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1996, at Al (discussing the
jury's decision not to sentence the Menendez brothers to death).
100. See Jurors Want to Ask McVeigh "Why?'. Explanation at Trial of Anger
over Waco Just Wasn't Enough, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 16, 1997, at
4A (discussing the jury's decision to sentence McVeigh to death); Jo Thomas,
Agony Relived as U.S. Pursues McVeigh Death, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1997, at
Al (discussing the testimony of the victims' family members in the Oklahoma
City bombing).
101. See Man Gets Death Sentence for Killing Cellmate, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 4,
1993, at 6, available at 1993 WLNR 3974634 (discussing the details of Danks's
crime, conviction, and subsequent death sentence).
102. Bobbitt's Wife Guilty, Says Poll, S.F. EXAMINER, Jan. 16, 1994, at A-5;
see Hinds, supra note 15. Both sides tried to influence the jury with their pres-
entations of the parties. For example, John Bobbitt dressed without a tie (a
phallic symbol) to look less powerful and more like someone who would never
attack his wife. Id.
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evidence, and the jury should not have considered these factors
in rendering a verdict.103 Nevertheless, post-trial interviews in-
dicated that they did.104
In the infamous Menendez Brothers' case, the defense si-
milarly tried to manipulate the jury by the manner in which
the defendants dressed and acted at the counsel table. During
the first trial for murdering their parents, 105 defense counsel
dressed the defendants in crewneck sweaters, button-down
shirts, and slacks. 06 This young, preppy look added to the illu-
sion that the "boys" were incapable of committing the vicious
acts with which they were charged.107
First-hand accounts from the jurors in the first Menendez
trial chronicle the extent to which the jurors observed and con-
sidered the nontestimonial demeanor of the defendants. Hazel
Thornton, one of the jurors in the case, recalled that during the
opening statements "Erik cried, noticeably but unobtrusively,
when Ms. Abramson talked about his mother."'108 She then
noted that when Lyle testified as to his father's sexual abuse of
Erik, Erik cried. "[A]t one point he began taking his frustra-
tions out on his brother Erik in a sexual way ... [,] and this
was the most painful and dramatic thing to watch of all: Lyle's
public confession and apology to Erik, who of course was also in
103. See supra Part I.A.
104. See Bobbitt's Wife Guilty, Says Poll, supra note 102.
105. Lyle and Erik Menendez became the subject of one of the most sordid,
publicized murder cases in history when they went on trial for killing their
parents with a shotgun in their family's Beverly Hills mansion in 1989. See
Sally Ann Stewart, Beverly Hills Horror Story; Brothers Say Parents' Abuse
Led Them to Kill; Defense Says Good Life Was Just a Facade, USA TODAY,
Sept. 21, 1993, at 1A. The brothers attempted to justify murdering their par-
ents by asserting that their parents had sexually abused them and that the
brothers were afraid for their lives. Id. Their first trial ended in a hung jury
when the jury could not agree on whether the defendants committed murder
or manslaughter. O'Neill & Riccardi, supra note 99. On retrial, they were both
convicted of murder and sentenced to life in prison. Id.
106. Stewart, supra note 105.
107. Id.; see also THORNTON, supra note 11, at 73-74 (stating that the ju-
rors noticed the brothers' dress, references to "boys," and the defense counsel's
maternal behavior and guessed that it was likely to elicit juror sympathy).
108. See THORNTON, supra note 11, at 9. Of course, it is impossible to know
why Menendez cried when his mother was mentioned. Like other nontesti-
monial demeanor, a defendant may be reacting because he is genuinely sad-
dened by the loss of his mother or because he regrets his involvement in her
death. Even the sincerest of reactions can be confusing to jurors. They add an
emotional dimension to the case, but do little to answer key factual questions
in a case.
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tears."10 9 Thornton also noted that she and other jurors "specu-
late[d] endlessly about the audience"'110 and tried desperately to
put together the story of the trial from who was in attendance.
Even during deliberations, jurors observed the defendants' de-
meanor during testimony readbacks. 111 As one sociologist noted
after studying the juror's book, it is clear that jurors notice
things in the courtroom that are not evidence, and "it is diffi-
cult, if not impossible, for someone to ignore or fail to be influ-
enced by information provided by any avenue."'112
Similarly, consider how important courtroom demeanor
was in the trial of Timothy McVeigh. 113 In death penalty cases,
jurors are instructed to consider all aspects of the defendant,
including his character, in deciding what punishment to im-
pose. 1 14 Thus, it is not surprising that jurors tend to be influ-
109. Id. at 25.
110. Id. at 47.
111. Id. at 85 (describing how Erik was mortified when readback testimony
focused on him being a homosexual). One of the most interesting parts of
Thornton's book is the "Psychological Commentary on the Diary" provided by
two noted social scientists, Lawrence S. Wrightsman and Amy J. Posey. See id.
at 99. Using Thornton's diary, Wrightsman and Posey attack some of the basic
assumptions we have about jurors and how they decide cases. Id. at 101-03.
For example, they attack the assumption that jurors focus only on admissible
evidence during trial. Id. at 108. Specifically, they note that jurors look to the
reaction of the defendant while someone is testifying against him or her and
may be influenced by the physical appearance of the trial participants. Id. at
111. Thornton notes in her diary that jurors discussed the fact that the defen-
dants wore sweaters and that Leslie Abramson (defense counsel) often en-
gaged in maternal behavior when interacting with Erik Menendez. Id. at 111-
12. The jurors also recognized, however, that these actions may have been a
ploy to elicit juror sympathy. Id.
112. Id. at 112.
113. Timothy McVeigh was convicted of all eleven counts of bombing the
Oklahoma City federal building. See James Collins, Day of Reckoning: The
Jury that Found McVeigh Guilty Wrestles with Emotion and Tears as It Pre-
pares to Decide His Fate, TIME, June 16, 1997, at 26 (discussing the sentencing
phase of the McVeigh trial). Jurors reported being influenced by McVeigh's icy
composure as prosecutors argued that he should be sentenced to death. See
Killer Maintains Icy Composure, Waves to Parents, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland),
June 14, 1997, at 1-A.
114. Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instructions [CALCRIM]
No. 763 (2007), available" at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/jury/
criminaljuryinstructions/calcrimjuryins.pdf; see also CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 190.3 (West 1999); Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 972 (1994) (noting
that, during the selection stage of capital cases, the jury must make "an indi-
vidualized determination on the basis of the character of the individual and
the circumstances of the crime." (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879
(1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); People v. Ramos, 938 P.2d 950,
970-71 (Cal. 1997) (noting that, in a capital case, the sentencer may evaluate
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enced in death penalty cases by a defendant's demeanor and
reactions in the courtroom. 115 McVeigh's demeanor was scruti-
nized and analyzed by jurors, as well as by the media: "Like his
clothing-solid-colored, long-sleeved, open-necked shirts and
khaki pants-Mr. McVeigh's demeanor [was] distinguished by
its blandness." 116 Some compared him to a "soldier standing
trial in enemy country."1 7 McVeigh's demeanor personified
the defendant's lack of remorse and overt indifference or callousness toward
his misdeeds).
115. See Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Jury and Absolution: The Intersec-
tion of Trial Strategy, Remorse, and the Death Penalty, 83 CORNELL L. REV.
1557, 1561-66 (1998) (providing a sampling of juror statements indicating
that one of the primary factors used by jurors in deciding that a death penalty
defendant lacked remorse and therefore deserved to die was the jurors' percep-
tions of the defendant's flat and nonchalant behavior at trial). While it may
not be surprising that jurors in death penalty cases scrutinize a defendant's
courtroom demeanor to assess the defendant's character and his level of re-
morse, it is surprising that courts do not issue standardized instructions to
jurors to disabuse them of the notion that a defendant's demeanor in the cour-
troom may not actually reflect the defendant's true character, including the
defendant's level of remorse or likelihood of future dangerousness. For years,
defense counsel have been concerned that jurors' decisions are improperly in-
fluenced in death penalty cases by a defendant's demeanor, and rightfully so.
See Brief for the American Bar Ass'n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner
at 12-14, McCarver v. State, 532 U.S. 941 (2001) (No. 00-8727), cert. dis-
missed, 533 U.S. 975 (2001). During the capital murder trial of John Paul Pe-
nry, the mentally retarded defendant "'sat at the defense table and drew pic-
tures' while the prosecutor summed up why Penry should be sentenced to die."
Id. (quoting ROBERT PERSKE, UNEQUAL JUSTICE? 19, 21-22 (1991)). During
the trial of Anthony Porter, the mentally retarded defendant would, "'walk[]
into a room slowly, real cool, like some streetwise punk, a smirk on his face,
eyes shifting back and forth, as if he [was] on to something or in on a big se-
cret'-clearly inappropriate behavior from someone accused of a heinous
crime." Id. (quoting Eric Zorn, Questions Persist as Troubled Inmate Faces Ex-
ecution, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 21, 1998, at MetroChicago 1); see also State v. Rizzo,
833 A.2d 363, 431-32 (Conn. 2003) ("Among the factors that may be consi-
dered by a court at a sentencing hearing are the defendant's demeanor and his
lack of veracity and remorse as observed by the court during the course of the
trial on the merits." (quoting State v. Anderson, 561 A.2d 897, 905 (Conn.
1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Schiro v. State, 479 N.E.2d 556,
559-60 (Ind. 1985) (holding that the trial judge did not violate the defendant's
due process rights or Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination when
he considered the defendant's continuous rocking motions during trial in sen-
tencing the defendant to death).
116. Victoria Loe, McVeigh Gives Observers Little to Go on in Court: Defen-
dant's Demeanor Leaves Reporters, Families Guessing, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Apr. 12, 1997, at 1A.
117. CBS This Morning: Oklahoma City Bombing Jury in Deliberations to
Decide Whether Timothy McVeigh Should Get the Death Penalty (CBS televi-
sion broadcast June 13, 1997).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
that of a "cold, heartless and calculating killer,"118 leading a ju-
ror to later state, "I don't understand how any man or woman
could not have shown any emotion one way or the other. It said
he didn't care."119 Even though jurors claimed not to have dis-
cussed McVeigh's demeanor during deliberations, some noted
individually that they "wanted to see some remorse," and one
juror claimed that he "was very bothered that [McVeigh] was so
stone-faced." 120 Indeed, a stoic defendant in the courtroom
sends the unspoken message to the jury that he just does not
care.
121
In all three of these high-profile cases, 122 the defendants'
demeanors in the courtroom may very well have influenced
their respective fates; the same is likely true in routine crimi-
nal prosecutions that transpire every day in the nation's court-
houses but which garner little or no media attention. Consider,
for example, the reported, yet not particularly famous, case of
People v. Danks.123 In Danks, the defendant physically attacked
his lawyer during the penalty phase of his death penalty
case. 124 After stabbing his lawyer twice in the face, Danks
headed toward the jury box before he was subdued by the she-
riffs. 125 The court was not particularly worried about the im-
pact of this spectacle on the jury.126 It gave only a cursory in-
118. Killer Maintains Icy Composure, Waves to Parents, supra note 113.
119. Jurors' Enduring Question: Why? But Little Wavering When It Came
Time for Their Decision, USA TODAY, June 16, 1997, at 4A.
120. Tom Kenworthy & William Booth, Bomb Jurors Profoundly Affected:
Sympathy Declared for Oklahomans, WASH. POST, June 15, 1997, at Al.
121. This problem with a defendant's demeanor may also occur in noncap-
ital cases. For example, in the case of George Weller, the eighty-nine-year-old
man convicted of killing ten people by crashing his car through a farmer's
market in Santa Monica, California, did not even attend most of the trial be-
cause of his poor health. See Spano, supra note 5. Nonetheless, some experts
believe that the jurors held Weller's absence against him because he did not
come to court, sit through the evidence, and thereby show remorse for his ac-
tions. See id. (referencing comments of Ken Broda-Bahm, President of the
American Society of Trial Consultants).
122. The three cases referred to include the trials of the Menendez broth-
ers, Timothy McVeigh, and Lorena Bobbitt.
123. 82 P.3d 1249 (Cal. 2004).
124. Id. at 1262 n.3.
125. Id. Remarkably, this was not the first time Danks tried to stab his
lawyer. See Edwin Chen, Killer of 6 Transients Pleads Guilty in Deal, Gets Life
Prison Term, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1988, at Metro 3. In a previous trial for the
murders of six transients in the Los Angeles area, Danks cut his attorney in
the face before being subdued. Id.
126. The courtroom stabbing incident is only discussed in a footnote in the
court's opinion, even though Danks referred to the incident during his own
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struction that the defendant's conduct should not be considered
as evidence and then continued with the penalty phase of the
capital trial127 -a stage in which the jury must decide whether
the defendant's future dangerousness should be an aggravating
factor justifying imposition of the death penalty. 128
It is not just prosecutors who seek to capitalize on a defen-
dant's nontestifying demeanor in influencing jurors' deci-
sions. 129 Defense counsel are also known to comment on the de-
fendant's courtroom appearance to make their case. For
example, in the recent murder case of music mogul Phillip
Spector, the defense lawyer asked his expert why he believed
that the shooting was a suicide, and not a homicide.13 0 Seeking
to persuade the jurors that the victim could have overpowered
any attempts by Spector to kill her, the expert directed the ju-
rors' attention toward the way Spector looked during trial.' 3 '
With a slight build, changing hairdo, "Parkinsonian-type face,"
and his hands trembling, defense lawyer used Spector's cour-
troom image to persuade the jurors that Spector was not a kill-
er.132
All of these cases provide evidence that a defendant's cour-
troom demeanor can have potentially serious ramifications on
the outcome of a case; yet courts are reluctant to take a consis-
tent approach to dealing with this issue. As the next Section
details, most courts make no effort to direct jurors on whether
and how to consider a defendant's courtroom demeanor. So long
as the parties do not comment on the defendant's demeanor in
closing argument, some courts assume that the jurors will ig-
nore it-a very dubious assumption, indeed. Other courts not
only permit jurors to consider a defendant's demeanor, but also
allow the parties to comment on it throughout the trial. In their
view, how a defendant acts in the courtroom is a legitimate fac-
tor for jurors to consider in making a decision. 133
testimony before the jury. Danks, 82 P.3d at 1262 n.3.
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1999); Brown v. Payton, 544
U.S. 133, 136-38 (2005); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 588 (2002); People v.
Medina, 906 P.2d 2, 44-47 (Cal. 1995).
129. See infra Part III.
130. Transcript of Record at 6494-96, People v. Spector, (Cal. Super. Ct.
June 28, 2007) (No. BA255233).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. For these courts, as well as for the legendary John Henry Wigmore, it
is both unrealistic and counterproductive to assume that jurors can be "men-
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III. THE SPLIT: TO ACKNOWLEDGE OR NOT TO
ACKNOWLEDGE A DEFENDANT'S DEMEANOR
IN THE COURTROOM?
Today's courts are divided on how to consider a defendant's
nontestifying demeanor in the courtroom. This division among
judges is best illustrated by the Ninth Circuit's divided opinion
in United States v. Schuler.134 The majority in that case re-
jected the express use of demeanor evidence during a criminal
case, finding even the referral to it by the prosecution as a vi-
olation of due process.'35 The dissenting judge, however, along
with judges in other jurisdictions, supported the use of such
evidence, noting that demeanor evidence can be helpful to ju-
rors in assessing a defendant's credibility and culpability.136
A. THE SCHULER SPLIT
In Schuler, the defendant, Scott Schuler, was charged with
threatening the life of then-President Ronald Reagan. 137 Schu-
ler made the threatening remarks when he flew into a tirade
after being arrested at a department store for shoplifting. 138 In
addition to uttering racial slurs and an assortment of other
vulgar comments, Schuler told the police that "when the Presi-
dent came to town, he would get him."'139
At trial, Schuler's counsel claimed that Schuler's remark
was just a general expression of anger directed at law enforce-
ment and not a serious threat.140 Schuler's first trial ended in a
mistrial.14' In Schuler's second trial, the prosecutor took extra
steps during his closing argument to convince the jury that
Schuler's threats were serious, stating:
[W]hile Mr. Schuler was being interrogated by the two security
agents, Schuler made a number of racial comments about the number
of people he was going to kill, a number of sexual comments. I noticed
tally blind" to a defendant's demeanor off the stand. See 2 JOHN HENRY WIG-
MORE, EVIDENCE § 274(2), at 119-20 (4th ed. 1979) (advocating that a defen-
dant's demeanor off the witness stand and in the courtroom should be consi-
dered admissible evidence).
134. 813 F.2d 978 (9th Cir. 1987) (2-1 decision).
135. See id. at 981.
136. See id. at 983-84 (Hall, J., dissenting) (stating that it is "well-settled"
that a defendant's "courtroom demeanor is evidence").
137. See id. at 979 (majority opinion).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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a number of you were looking at Mr. Schuler while that testimony
was coming in and a number of you saw him laugh and saw him
laugh as they were repeated.142
Defense counsel objected to the prosecutor's statement, but
the trial judge overruled the objection and instructed the jury
that the prosecutor's argument was proper.143
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed Schuler's conviction
on two separate grounds. 144 First, the court held that the prose-
cutor had improperly injected the issue of the defendant's bad
character into the trial in contravention of Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 404(a) because Schuler had not first offered evidence of
good character. 145 This approach is similar to that of other
courts which, analogizing demeanor evidence to character evi-
dence, refuse to allow the prosecution to comment on the de-
fendant's demeanor unless the defendant's character has be-
come an express issue in the case. 146
The majority then went on to its second ground for revers-
ing Schuler's conviction. 147 In doing so, the court addressed
head-on the issue of whether a defendant's demeanor in the
courtroom should play a role in determining his guilt or inno-
cence. The court ruled that "in the absence of a curative in-
142. Id. (alteration in original).
143. Id.
144. See id. at 982-83. Defense counsel had argued several grounds for re-
versible error, including that the prosecutor's comments improperly consti-
tuted an indirect comment on the defendant's failure to testify at trial. See id.
at 979-80 (setting forth the issues on appeal). The court, however, did not rest
its decision solely on that argument. In a footnote, the court noted that other
courts have rejected claims that a prosecutor's comments on the "expression-
less courtroom demeanor of a defendant" necessarily constitutes an indirect
comment on the defendant's failure to testify. See id. at 980 n.1 (citing Boro-
dine v. Douzanis, 592 F.2d 1202, 1210-11 (1st Cir. 1979); Bishop v. Wain-
wright, 511 F.2d 664, 668 (5th Cir. 1975)). See generally Brett H. McGurk,
Prosecutorial Comment on a Defendant's Presence at Trial: Will Griffin Play in
a Sixth Amendment Arena?, 31 UWLA L. REV. 207, 244-50 (2000) (discussing
the factfinder's use of a defendant's demeanor in the courtroom). Judge Boo-
chever wrote, "we doubt that jurors would construe the prosecutor's comment
on Schuler's laughter as referring to his failure to testify." Schuler, 813 F.2d at
982. Although the court was concerned that allowing prosecutors to comment
on a defendant's demeanor may force a defendant to testify to explain his
courtroom demeanor, id. at 982, the focus of the court's decision was on the
broader issue in the case: are comments regarding a defendant's demeanor
improper because they impermissibly convict a defendant on the basis of in-
formation that cannot be considered evidence from the witness stand?
145. See Schuler, 813 F.2d at 980-81.
146. See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 489 F.2d 1181, 1186 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
147. See Schuler, 813 F.2d at 981-82.
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struction from the court, a prosecutor's comment on a defen-
dant's off-the-stand behavior constitutes a violation of the due
process clause of the [F]ifth [A]mendment. That clause encom-
passes the right not to be convicted except on the basis of evi-
dence adduced at trial."'148 Because a defendant's nontestifying
demeanor is not a traditional form of courtroom evidence, it
should not be considered by the jury. Allowing a prosecutor to
refer to demeanor would be the equivalent of allowing the pros-
ecutor to refer to any other extraneous information that was
not presented during the trial.149 Demeanor is information out-
side the record of the case and goes beyond admissible evi-
dence. 150
Both aspects of the majority's decision are problematic.
First, it was a stretch for the court to claim that the prosecutor
had improperly introduced character evidence into the trial. In
referring to the defendant's courtroom demeanor, the prosecu-
tor did not argue that Schuler was an angry, hostile person and
thus guilty of the crime charged. If anything, it was the defense
who claimed that Schuler's statements reflected his antigo-
vernment attitude and not his intended actions. 151 Instead, the
prosecutor confined his remarks to highlighting how Schuler
148. Id. at 981. In support of its holding, the court noted that the Eleventh
Circuit had also confronted the issue of a prosecutor commenting during clos-
ing arguments on the defendant's behavior off the witness stand. Id, (citing
United States v. Pearson, 746 F.2d 787 (11th Cir. 1984)). In United States v.
Pearson, the prosecutor argued: "Does it sound to you like [the defendant] was
afraid? You saw him sitting there in the trial. Did you see his leg going up and
down? He is nervous. (Appellant's objection overruled) You saw how nervous
he was sitting there. Do you think he is afraid?" 746 F.2d at 796 (quoting
Transcript of Record at 145-46, Pearson, 746 F.2d 787 (No. 83-5161)). The
Pearson court held that the prosecutor's statement gave the jury the wrong
impression that the defendant's behavior off the witness stand was evidence
and, as a result, violated the defendant's right to be convicted only on the evi-
dence introduced at trial. Id. See generally Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478,
490 (1978) (holding that the trial court's failure to issue a requested instruc-
tion on the defendant's presumption of innocence violated his right to a fair
trial as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
The Schuler court also relied on United States v. Carroll, 678 F.2d 1208, 1210
(4th Cir. 1982), and Wright, 489 F.2d at 1186. Schuler, 813 F.2d at 980-81. In
both cases, the courts held that the defendants' conduct off the witness stand
was not legally relevant to the question of their guilt or innocence for the
crimes with which they were respectively charged. See Carroll, 678 F.2d at
1209-10; Wright, 489 F.2d at 1186.
149. Schuler, 813 F.2d at 981.
150. Id.
151. See id. at 984 (Hall, J., dissenting).
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had responded when the witnesses testified to his actions. 152
Without claiming that Schuler was a violent person and there-
fore guilty of threatening the President, the prosecution sug-
gested that Schuler's laughter and cavalier manner during the
trial were an indication that he did not regret making the
threatening remarks that he had made. 153
Second, the majority's claim that the prosecutor's reference
to the defendant's courtroom demeanor violated due process
was not well supported. If in fact the court really believed such
observations were not evidence, then it would have barred the
jurors from considering it at all during deliberations, rather
than just prohibiting a prosecutor's reference to it. There is no
suggestion in the majority's decision that a court must sua
sponte instruct a juror to disregard a defendant's demeanor in
every case, yet this "non-evidence" is evident throughout the
trial. Although a defendant's nontestifying demeanor does not
fall within the traditional categories of evidence,154 it is not the
same as information that is never presented in the courtroom.
In dissent, Judge Cynthia Holcomb Hall similarly took is-
sue with the majority's conclusion that a jury cannot consider a
defendant's nontestimonial courtroom demeanor because it is
not evidence:
Sound policy reasons exist for allowing a jury to consider the cour-
troom demeanor of a defendant. As Wigmore noted: "[I]t is as unwise
to attempt the impossible as it is impolitic to conduct trials upon a fic-
tion; and the attempt to force a jury to become mentally blind to the
behavior of the accused sitting before them involves both an impossi-
bility in practice and a fiction in theory."155
According to Judge Hall, it was perfectly reasonable for the
jury to consider the defendant's demeanor in response to the
evidence adduced at trial to assess whether he had intended his
remarks about harming the President to constitute a genuine
threat.156 Schuler's demeanor in the courtroom helped answer a
key issue in the case-Schuler's intent at the time of the al-
leged threat.1 57 Was Schuler serious about his remarks, or did
152. See id. at 979 (majority opinion).
153. See id. at 980.
154. See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
155. Schuler, 813 F.2d at 983 (Hall, J., dissenting) (quoting 2 WIGMORE,
supra note 133, § 274(2), at 119-20) (alteration in original).
156. See id. ("In this case, Schuler's bizarre behavior in the courtroom
lends credence to the government's claim that his threat was indeed serious.").
157. See id. at 979 (majority opinion).
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he treat them as a joke? 158 For Judge Hall, a defendant's de-
meanor should be considered a form of relevant evidence be-
cause it serves the same purpose as evidence under Rule
404(b). 159 That rule allows evidence of other acts if they are
used to prove a defendant's intent.160
The Schuler case represents the split in how judges view
the theater of the courtroom. For many judges, like the majori-
ty in Schuler, verdicts must be based solely on the evidence ad-
duced from the witness stand; nothing else that happens in the
courtroom should matter. However, for judges like Judge Hall,
who dissented to the Schuler opinion, a trial takes on an addi-
tional dimension that the evidence rules do not directly ad-
dress. Under this view, the parties' actions in the courtroom are
relevant to helping the jury assess the evidence presented to it
from the witness stand.
158. See id. at 985 (Hall, J., dissenting).
159. See id. at 984. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove
the character of a person in order to show action in conformity there-
with. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the
accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable
notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial
notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evi-
dence it intends to introduce at trial.
FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
Rule 404(b) is considered an exception to the general rule that character
evidence may not be used to demonstrate the propensity of a defendant to
commit a crime. See, e.g., United States v. Matthews, 431 F.3d 1296, 1319
(11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 46 (2006). Because the rule allows for
the introduction of specific acts to prove specific issues, it does not allow the
parties to argue simply that because the defendant did something wrong be-
fore, he must have done it again. See, e.g., United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d
874, 879 (10th Cir. 1998) (stating that in certain cases, Rule 414 replaces Rule
404(b) and allows the prosecution to use evidence of the defendant's prior
acts). Rather, the incident tends to prove a specific point, such that the defen-
dant acted intentionally with regard to a specific act. See Schuler, 813 F.2d at
984 (Hall, J., dissenting). In the context of a defendant's demeanor in the cour-
troom, proponents of the evidence argue that the defendant's demeanor evi-
dence is evidence of "other acts" that can explain whether the defendant's ac-
tions for which he is charged were intentional. See, e.g., id. Thus, because the
defendant laughs in the courtroom over references to his prior threats, jurors
can infer that those threats were serious and intentional. See id. at 984-85.
160. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
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B. IN THE PATH OF SCHULER
Several courts have taken an approach similar to that of
the Schuler majority. For example, in Bryant v. State, a murder
trial in which the defendant chose not to testify,16 1 the prosecu-
tor commented during closing arguments:
There is so much evidence that corroborates what [the prosecution's
witness] told you. When I spoke about her demeanor when she testi-
fied, and how she answered [defense counsel's] questions, did you no-
tice the defendant's demeanor when she testified, the way he kept
looking down and couldn't look at her? She looked in his eyes several
times .... You observed that, members of the jury, you were sitting
here. We all saw it. He couldn't sit up and look her in the eye because
he knew she was telling the truth. He knew she was telling the
truth.1
62
On appeal, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals over-
turned the defendant's convictions and ordered a new trial on
the ground that the trial judge committed reversible error by
failing to sustain the defendant's timely objection to the prose-
cutor's statement regarding the defendant's courtroom demea-
nor.163 The court drew a distinction between consideration of
the demeanor of testifying defendants and nontestifying defen-
dants. Although it acknowledged that courts reach conflicting
conclusions on the issue, 16 4 the Bryant majority held that in its
view:
[T]he courtroom demeanor of a defendant who has not testified is irre-
levant. His demeanor has not been entered into evidence and, there-
fore, comment is beyond the scope of legitimate summary. Moreover
the practice is pregnant with potential prejudice. A guilty verdict
161. 741 A.2d 495, 499 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999). In Bryant, the defendant
was convicted of first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, and two
counts of using a handgun in the commission of a felony. Id. at 498. He re-
ceived a life sentence for the murder conviction and concurrent sentences for
the remaining convictions. Id.
162. Id. at 498-99 (second alteration in original). During the criminal trial,
the prosecution's principal witness Florence Winston testified that she wit-
nessed the shooting, and that she spoke with the defendant the following
morning. Id. at 497. Winston testified that the defendant "looked nervous"'
and apologized for shooting in her direction the night before. Id. Winston was
a "self-described 'dope-fiend' who sold crack cocaine to support her drug habit,
and she had agreed to testify against the defendant in exchange for assistance
with theft and probation violation charges that were pending against her. Id.
at 497-98. During closing arguments, the prosecutor acknowledged Winston's
self-interested motive for testifying, and conceded that "Winston's lifestyle was
not exemplary." Id. at 498. The prosecutor then tried to corroborate and lend
credibility to Winston's testimony by highlighting the defendant's demeanor
during Winston's testimony. Id.
163. Id. at 501-03.
164. Id. at 499-500.
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must be based upon the evidence and the reasonable inferences there-
from, not on an irrational response which may be triggered if the
prosecution unfairly strikes an emotion in the jury. 165
The Bryant court thus rejected all attempts to allow the
jury to consider a defendant's courtroom demeanor in its deci-
sion, concluding that the prosecutor's comments regarding the
defendant's demeanor were improper because they were not
based upon "evidence" and because they constituted an emo-
tional appeal to the jurors. 166
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Delaware held it is impro-
per for prosecutors to comment on a nontestifying defendant's
courtroom demeanor. 167 In Hughes v. State, the defendant had
been convicted of his wife's murder based entirely on circums-
tantial evidence. 168 Hughes sought reversal citing a litany of
improper actions by the prosecution including misstating evi-
165. Id. at 500 (citations omitted).
166. Id. But see Brothers v. State, 183 So. 433, 436 (Ala. 1938) (holding
that the defendant's courtroom demeanor is a proper subject of comment
where the defendant's sanity was a primary issue in the case and the defen-
dant may have been seeking to create an impression of insanity through his
demeanor before the jury); Campbell v. State, 501 A.2d 111, 114 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1985) (holding that "[t]he circumstances and the nature and language of
the comment" may justify an exception to the general rule that statements re-
garding the defendant's personal appearance are improper except with regard
to the defendant's appearance while testifying or where the defendant's identi-
ty is at issue).
167. Hughes v. State, 437 A.2d 559, 572 (Del. 1981).
168. Id. at 563, 576. Robert D. Hughes was charged with the first-degree
murder of his wife. Id. at 564. The victim was found lying in the driveway near
the rear of defendant's house, after Hughes called the police department to re-
port that he needed an ambulance. Id. at 562. When the police arrived, they
found the victim covered in blood, with a rope around her neck. Id. She had
suffered two blows to the head, but the cause of death was ligature strangula-
tion. Id. Hughes did not testify, but he told the police that he found his wife's
body in the driveway. Id. at 563.
The prosecution built its case on circumstantial evidence. The victim's fa-
ther testified that the rope used in the strangling was the same rope that had
been attached to his grandson's wagon. Id. Defendant had also given some cu-
rious statements to the police. For example, when asked about the possibility
that blood might be found in his house or on his clothing, he stated that it was
because his wife had a heavy menstrual flow recently or because he played
with a neighbor's dog that was in heat. Id. at 564. A neighbor testified that on
the night of the murder, he had heard what he believed was a man and a
woman arguing. Id. at 565. Other witnesses testified as to Hughes' reaction to
the murder, with the conflicting testimony "ranging from 'he showed no emo-
tion' to descriptions of shock, tears and distress." Id. There was also physical
evidence suggesting that the blanket covering the victim's body had been
placed there earlier than when Hughes admitted he had found the body. Id. at
565-66.
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dence and, during summation, impermissibly commenting that
the defendant's courtroom demeanor was "unemotional, unfeel-
ing and without remorse."'169 The court viewed the courtroom
demeanor of a nontestifying defendant as "irrelevant."170 Since
the defendant's demeanor had not been entered into evidence,
such a comment "is beyond the scope of legitimate sum-
mary."'17 1 Because demeanor is not technically evidence and a
jury's verdict must be based upon evidence, the court held that
the jurors should not be allowed to draw any inferences, sug-
gested by counsel, from their perceptions of the defendant's
courtroom behavior. 172
Similarly, in Baldez v. State, the Florida District Court of
Appeal reversed a defendant's conviction for sexual battery on
a minor because the prosecutor commented in closing argument
that the defendant had been glaring at the victim's eight-year-
old brother when he testified that he saw the defendant rape
the girl. 173 Although witness intimidation may be very relevant
to a juror's decision on witness credibility, the Schuler court, 174
like the Baldez court, held that it was improper for the prosecu-
tion to try and bolster the witness's testimony by arguing that
the victim was able to testify despite the defendant's intimida-
tion. 175
169. Id. at 572.
170. Id.
171. Id. As the court noted, it is dangerous to assume that there is such a
thing as a model of "normal" courtroom behavior. "[O]ne may reveal or conceal
emotion for innumerable reasons, and a defendant should not be subjected to a
guilty verdict because his courtroom appearance did not comport with the
prosecution's notion of a norm." Id.
172. Id.; see also Craig v. United States, 81 F.2d 816, 829 (9th Cir. 1936)
(stating that asking jurors to keep an eye on defendant's demeanor during
closing arguments was ill-advised, but not reversible error); People v. Garcia,
206 Cal. Rptr. 468, 472-75 (Ct. App. 1984) (finding that the prosecutor acted
improperly in referring to defendant's courtroom behavior); Baldez v. State,
679 So. 2d 825, 826 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) ("It is improper for a prosecutor
to comment on the defendant's demeanor when he is not on the witness
stand." (citing Pope v. Wainwright, 496 So. 2d 798, 802 (Fla. 1986))); Blue v.
State, 674 So. 2d 1184, 1213-15 (Miss. 1996) (explaining that the prosecutor
may not comment on the nontestifying defendant's demeanor and appearance
during trial).
173. Baldez, 679 So. 2d at 826-27.
174. See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
175. Baldez, 679 So. 2d at 827. The Florida courts had previously held that
a prosecutor cannot comment on a defendant's demeanor when the defendant
is not on the witness stand. See Wainwright, 496 So. 2d at 802 (finding that
the prosecutor erred by arguing in closing argument that the defendant was
"grinning from ear-to-ear" during the trial).
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As these cases demonstrate, many courts agree with the
Schuler majority and will not allow a defendant's nontestifying
demeanor to be considered as evidence in a case. If a prosecutor
draws the jurors' attention to a defendant's courtroom beha-
vior, even if it was obvious for all to see, it may be grounds for
reversal for violating the defendant's due process rights or im-
properly interjecting character evidence in the case. 176
C. A DIFFERENT PATH: ACKNOWLEDGING A DEFENDANT'S
COURTROOM DEMEANOR
While many courts have taken the same position as the
Schuler majority, a sizeable number of courts will allow jurors
to consider a defendant's demeanor off the witness stand in
making their decisions. 177 For example, in the famous trial of
the Kennedy cousin Michael Skakel, a juror reported that he
had seen the defendant mouth something like "good job" to his
testifying cousin. 178 The defendant's conduct bothered the juror
a great deal and the defense complained that the juror should
be removed because he was considering information that was
not formally evidence in the trial.179 The trial judge rejected the
defense's claim, accepting the prosecutor's argument that "the
jury is allowed to consider the defendant's demeanor in the
courtroom." 1
80
176. See United States v. Schuler, 813 F.2d 978, 980-81 (9th Cir. 1987). In
addition to these legal grounds for reversal, defendants also try to claim that
their Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify is violated by the prosecutor's
reference to the defendant's courtroom demeanor. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
However, this argument is ordinarily rejected because the prosecutor's remark
is not viewed as a comment on the defendant's failure to testify, but rather a
comment on what the defendant otherwise communicated to the jury during
trial. See, e.g., Schuler, 813 F.2d at 982; Hughes, 437 A.2d at 573.
177. 2 WIGMORE, supra note 133, § 274(2), at 119-20 (arguing that demea-
nor off the witness stand and in the courtroom is admissible evidence and
dismissing as unrealistic the belief that jurors can be "mentally blind" to de-
meanor off the stand).
178. Lynne Tuohy, A Furor over Juror's Remark Proceedings Stalled by Al-
leged Comments from Skakel, HARTFORD COURANT, May 24, 2002, at B7 (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). Skakel was convicted of murder twenty-five
years after he bludgeoned his teenage neighbor to death with a golf club be-
cause she had spurned his advances. See generally Kennedy Cousin on Trial,
COURTTV.CoM, http://www.courttv.com/trials/moxley/index.html (last visited
Nov. 25, 2007) (providing access to various articles regarding the Skakel mur-
der case).
179. Tuohy, supra note 178.
180. Id.
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Similarly, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
held that a prosecutor may comment on the defendant's squir-
ming, smirking, and laughing during trial.1 81 In State v. Brown,
the defendant was charged with first-degree murder for am-
bushing and shooting Wayne Gerald over a stolen moped.
18 2
The evidence was overwhelming; the defendant had admitted
to family members that he had killed the 'son-of-a-bitch." 8 3
During the penalty phase of the capital trial, Smith's mother
and brother testified that Brown was a generally amicable fel-
low. 184 In his closing argument, the prosecutor tried to rebut
the defense claim that Brown deserved to be spared.18 5 He ar-
gued that the defendant had failed to show remorse during the
trial:
Have you seen this defendant express one iota of being sorry in this
case, of being contrite? ... Did you observe, when this widow was on
this witness stand testifying and broke down into sobs and it took
several minutes for her to gain control of herself, did you see one tear
roll down the face of this defendant sitting over there? If you watched
him-and some of you did-you saw him sitting there very coolly,
very coolly, musing, watching, calculating.1 8
6
On appeal, Brown complained that the prosecutor's argu-
ment improperly placed before the jury "incompetent and pre-
judicial matters."'1 7 However, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina rejected this argument. Like the dissent in Schuler,8 8
the court believed that "[u]rging the jurors to observe defen-
dant's demeanor for themselves does not inject the prosecutor's
own opinions into his argument, but calls to the jurors' atten-
tion the fact that evidence is not only what they hear on the
stand but what they witness in the courtroom."'8 9 Observations
about a defendant's demeanor are "rooted in the evidence" be-
181. Commonwealth v. Smith, 444 N.E.2d 374, 380 (Mass. 1983). The de-
fendant received a life sentence after being convicted of murder, arson and
armed robbery. Id. at 376. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ordered
a reversal and a new trial because of prosecutorial misconduct. Id. However,
the court found proper the prosecutor's comments on the defendant's demea-
nor, simply stating, "[t]he jury were entitled to observe the demeanor of the
defendant during the trial." Id. at 380.
182. 358 S.E.2d 1, 12 (N.C. 1987).
183. Id. at 8.
184. Id. at 14.
185. Id. at 13.
186. Id. at 15.
187. Id.
188. See supra notes 155-59 and accompanying text.
189. Brown, 358 S.E.2d at 15.
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cause the defendant's demeanor is before the jury at all
times.190
In the more extreme case of People v. Bizzell, the prosecu-
tor was so brazen as to argue in opening statement that the
jury would "see" that Bizzell's "own behavior in this courtroom
will indicate that he's guilty."191 As predicted, Bizzell was his
own worst enemy during trial. He displayed anger on and off
the witness stand to the point that his own lawyer had to re-
mind him to be "careful."192 These actions fed into the prosecu-
tor's argument that the defendant was out of control when he
tried to kill his victim. 193 In later proceedings, Bizzell com-
plained that it was ineffective assistance of counsel for his law-
yer to allow the prosecutor to make such arguments, but the
appellate court disagreed and upheld his conviction.1 94 The
court found that because Bizzell had testified, jurors could con-
sider not only his demeanor while on the witness stand, but al-
so his courtroom demeanor while not on the stand. 195
Thus, as these cases demonstrate, some judges not only
countenance jurors passively considering a defendant's demea-
nor in their decisions, but they also permit open references to
such demeanor during the case. For these courts, the courtroom
190. Id.; see Bishop v. Wainwright, 511 F.2d 664, 668 (5th Cir. 1975) (stat-
ing it is permissible to refer to defendant's expressionless courtroom demea-
nor); Wherry v. State, 402 So. 2d 1130, 1133 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981) (holding
that the prosecutor's comments during closing argument highlighting the de-
fendant's demeanor in order to challenge her plea of insanity were a proper
subject of comment rather than an improper attempt to draw attention to de-
fendant's failure to testify); State v. Myers, 263 S.E.2d 768, 773-74 (N.C.
1980) (finding that the prosecutor's comments on the defendant's reactions to
photographs of his murdered wife were permissible since his demeanor was
"before the jury at all times").
191. People v. Bizzell, No. A104615, 2005 WL 2842055, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App.
Oct. 31, 2005). Bizzell was convicted of assault, attempted murder, and other
crimes after he attacked his ex-girlfriend by choking her and holding a knife to
her throat. Id. at *2-3. During the trial, Bizzell frequently interrupted the
proceedings by making comments or laughing at statements. Id. at *4. The
court sustained several objections to Bizzell's answers when on the stand, in-
cluding that they were often narrative, nonresponsive, or that no question was
pending. Id.
192. Id. at *8.
193. See id. at *6 ("[We all know why we're here, power and control. The
defendant's conduct shows that. It shows that when he took the stand, it
shows that throughout this whole event . . . . He's out of control. You saw
that." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
194. Id. at *6-8.
195. Id. at *7-8.
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is a dynamic stage-a theater where everyone's role in reaching
the just verdict is properly considered.
D. FINDING MIDDLE GROUND
Finally, there are courts that attempt to set standards as
to when conduct by a defendant can be considered and when it
cannot. For example, in United States v. Cook, the defendant
was charged with the unpremeditated murder of his fourteen-
month-old daughter. 196 The defense claimed that Cook was in-
sane and had an expert witness testify on his behalf. 197 In clos-
ing argument, the prosecutor sought to counter the expert's
opinion by referring the jurors to their own observations of the
defendant and his demeanor in the courtroom:
You have had more observation of this accused sitting right here over
the course of the last two weeks than Dr. Hocter [the defense expert]
had. You've been able to gauge his response. You've been able to
watch him when a witness is talking about an aspect of his daughter's
death as he yawns, relaxes. He's really into this trial. Using your own
knowledge of the ways of the world and human mankind, what does
that mean to you? You're able to perceive him. You are better than
Dr. Hocter as to an opinion of what the accused intended. That's your
job. That's what you are here for. 19 8
On appeal, Cook complained that the prosecutor's argu-
ment improperly interjected his character in the case, violated
his right against self-incrimination, and trampled on his due
process right to be judged only on the "evidence" introduced at
trial. 199
The United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
held that the prosecutor's remarks were not plain error, it tried
to set guidelines as to when demeanor in the courtroom should
and should not be considered by the jury.200 Generally, the
court supported the majority's holding in Schuler and held that
nontestimonial acts, such as a defendant's laughter or yawns,
or a defendant's consultations with counsel, should not be con-
sidered as relevant evidence. 201 The court, however, stopped
short of holding that it would always be reversible error for a
prosecutor to draw the juror's attention to a defendant's non-
testimonial acts in the courtroom.
196. 48 M.J. 64, 65 (C.A.A.F. 1998).
197. Id.
198. Id. (footnote omitted).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 66-67.
201. Id.
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In the majority's opinion, Judge Susan Crawford began by
noting that a significant part of communication is nonverbal:
"Nonverbal communication may occur outside the courtroom as
well as on and off the witness stand."202 For example, threaten-
ing gestures by a defendant during trial are nontestimonial
acts that can be extremely relevant. 203 When relevant evidence
is presented to jurors on or off the witness stand, it should be
admissible. 204 Thus, the court was willing to accept that there
might be a proper role under some circumstances for the trier
of fact to consider demeanor in its decisions.205
However, the appellate court warned, "[i]nterpretations of
nonverbal communication are fallible and idiosyncratic. 206
When the intent of a defendant's nontestimonial behavior is
open to interpretation, it is more difficult to find that it is rele-
vant and admissible. 20 7 The Cook court suggested that the bur-
den should be on the defense counsel to object to and explain
why the information was not relevant, so that the court could
instruct jurors not to consider it in their decision making.20 8
The goal of the Cook court was to allow nonverbal commu-
nication to be considered evidence only when it has a particular
role to play and can be fairly interpreted. 20 9 Examples include
demonstrating whether a particular item of clothing fits a de-
fendant, 2 10 showing that the defendant bears physical charac-
202. Id. at 65 (citing JEFFREY L. KESTLER, QUESTIONING TECHNIQUES AND
TACTICS §§ 3.34-39, at 160-67 (2d ed. 1992)).
203. Id. at 66.
204. Id. The court cited in support of its position John Henry Wigmore who
"championed the view that demeanor off the witness stand and in the cour-
troom is admissible evidence .... [John Henry Wigmore] dismissed as fiction
the belief that the jurors can be 'mentally blind' to demeanor off the stand." Id.
(quoting 2 WIGMORE, supra note 133, § 274(2), at 119-20).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 65.
207. See id. at 66. The court cited Schuler for this principle, as well as two
other cases in which the prosecutor was found to have improperly commented
on a defendant's consultations with his lawyer during trial, United States v.
Carroll, 678 F.2d 1208, 1210 (4th Cir. 1982), or on the defendant's nervous leg
actions during trial, United States v. Pearson, 746 F.2d 787, 796 (11th Cir.
1984).
208. Cook, 48 M.J. at 67.
209. Id. at 66.
210. Prosecutor Christopher Darden's ill-fated use of a courtroom demon-
stration with the "bloody glove" during the O.J. Simpson murder trial provides
a perfect example of the use (or misuse) of nonverbal communication. Wanting
the jury to understand that the extensive "DNA evidence figuratively put the
gloves on Simpson," Darden had Simpson try the glove on, which apparently
did not fit. Stephen D. Easton, Lessons Learned the Hard Way from O.J. and
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teristics relevant to the case, 211 or even noting the defendant's
indifferent reaction when informed that the money in his wallet
was counterfeit. 212 In these situations, demeanor evidence is al-
lowed even though the defendant is not testifying because it is
clear what is being communicated by the defendant's actions. 213
Thus, a defendant's threats to witnesses or court participants
would also be properly considered as "evidence" that demon-
strates consciousness of guilt.214
However, when the defendant's conduct is ambiguous and
could reflect either a guilty or a not guilty consciousness, the
Cook court would be reluctant to allow the jury to consider it.
Thus, the Cook court cites the defendant's conduct in Schuler215
as an example of where it would find demeanor evidence to be
irrelevant. 21 6 Because the circumstances surrounding Schuler's
laughter were too ambiguous to necessarily indicate that he in-
tended to threaten the life of the President, they did not meet
"The Dream Team," 32 TULSA L.J. 707, 732-33 (1997) (discussing the O.J.
Simpson trial and reviewing CHRISTOPHER A. DARDEN WITH JESS WALTER, IN
CONTEMPT (1996)). See generally DARDEN WITH WALTER, supra. The implica-
tion of the glove fitting or not fitting had a particular role (whether or not it
was O.J.'s) and could be fairly interpreted (if it did not fit, it did not belong to
O.J.).
211. Courts tend to accept such evidence as proper "demonstrative evi-
dence" that may be considered by the jury. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 201
N.W.2d 286, 287-88 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972) (stating that the prosecutor was al-
lowed to comment on the defendant's efforts not to grin and show his teeth be-
cause the robbery suspect had been identified as having bad teeth). Professors
Robert Brain and Daniel Broderick define demonstrative evidence as "any dis-
play that is principally used to illustrate or explain other testimonial, docu-
mentary, or real proof, or a judicially noticed fact. It is, in short, a visual (or
other sensory) aid." Robert D. Brain & Daniel J. Broderick, The Derivative Re-
levance of Demonstrative Evidence: Charting Its Proper Evidentiary Status, 25
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 957, 968-69 (1992). Their work recognizes demonstrative
evidence as an analytically separate class of evidence. Id. at 967-72. They
highlight the defining characteristic of the evidence as being derivative in re-
levance, in that it has a "secondary or derivative function" because it is only
used to explain other previously introduced evidence. Id. at 961.
212. See United States v. Robinson, 523 F. Supp. 1006, 1012 (E.D.N.Y.
1981), aff'd, 685 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1982).
213. Id. at 1011-12.
214. See, e.g., United States v. Gatto, 995 F.2d 449, 454-55 (3d Cir. 1993)
(explaining that jurors may note threats or intimidation of witnesses); United
States v. Maddox, 944 F.2d 1223, 1226, 1229-30 (6th Cir. 1991) (finding that
jurors may consider the defendant's alleged mouthing of the words "you're
dead"); United States v. Mickens, 926 F.2d 1323, 1328-29 (2d Cir. 1991) (stat-
ing that the defendant's hand gesture in the shape of a gun may be considered
by the jury).
215. United States v. Schuler, 813 F.2d 978, 979 (9th Cir. 1987).
216. United States v. Cook, 48 M.J. 64, 66 (C.A.A.F. 1998).
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the Cook court's test that the relevancy of the nontestimonial
demeanor be obvious to the court and trier of fact. 217
Using this approach, it is therefore not surprising that the
Cook court found that it was improper for the prosecutor to
comment on the defendant's yawn while a witness described his
daughter's death.218 Under the Cook court's reasoning, a yawn
is too ambiguous to be relevant as to whether a defendant call-
ously killed his own daughter.
A similar issue existed in United States v. Pearson.21 9 Evi-
dently, one of the defendants, Petracelli, had the nervous habit
of shaking his leg throughout the trial and the judge allowed
comment on it (over objection) to the jury.220 The Eleventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals disagreed with the district court court's
approach, stating that "[i]n overruling Petracelli's objection and
in failing to give a curative instruction, the court, in effect, gave
the jury an incorrect impression that appellant's behavior off
the witness stand was evidence in this instance, upon which
the prosecutor was free to comment."221 Courts must be ex-
tremely careful not to communicate with jurors their impres-
sions of the evidence. 222 Just by allowing the prosecutor's re-
marks, the judge may have been conveying that he thought
that the defendant's nervous habit was evidence of guilt. Par-
ticularly in the situation of a defendant who has the habit of
shaking his leg, it is hard to know whether such actions really
reflect a guilty conscience or are the reaction to the strain of be-
ing on trial, which in fact might be even more stressful for an
217. Id.
218. Id. at 67. The court, however, did not overturn the conviction since the
trial defense counsel could have objected to the comment and because the re-
marks did not constitute plain error. Id.
219. 746 F.2d 787 (11th Cir. 1984).
220. Id. at 796.
221. Id.
222. See Douglas G. Smith, The Historical and Constitutional Contexts of
Jury Reform, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 377, 479-83 (1996) (stating that because of
the judge's position of authority, jurors often ascribe too much weight to the
judge's comments, thereby affecting the defendant's right to an "impartial"
hearing). See generally Jack B. Weinstein, The Power and Duty of Federal
Judges to Marshall and Comment on the Evidence in Jury Trials and Some
Suggestions on Charging Juries, 118 F.R.D. 161 (1988) (discussing the proprie-
ty and necessity of commenting on evidence by federal trial judges). When a
judge comments on matters at trial, a standard instruction given to the jury is:
"You are not to consider any statements or rulings which I have made during
the course of this trial as indicating that I believe the verdict should be one
way or the other. I have no opinion, and even if I did, it would be wholly irre-
levant." 1 LEVENTHAL, supra note 31, § 4:76.
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innocent person. Pearson reflects a situation in which, under
the Cook approach, 223 nontestifying demeanor evidence would
be irrelevant because its meaning is too ambiguous to be help-
ful to the jury.224
Similarly, courts would likely bar any reference by a prose-
cutor to a defendant's actions in assisting his lawyer at trial.
Courts are generally reluctant to interfere with the attorney-
client relationship. Thus, it is not surprising that in another
case cited by the court in Cook,225 United States v. Carroll, the
court held that comments about a defendant examining a court
exhibit and then explaining it to his lawyer were off-limits. 2 26
Interactions with defense counsel are to be expected in any tri-
al and do not demonstrate the guilt or innocence of a defen-
dant. 227
As these cases demonstrate, courts have taken different
approaches in dealing with the issue of jurors considering a de-
fendant's nontestimonial demeanor. 228 One judge may evaluate
a defendant's refusal to look a witness in the eye as evidence
that the defendant knows the witness is telling the truth;
another judge may find the defendant's demeanor irrelevant
because it could just be the reaction of an innocent person who
is afraid that a lying witness will convict him.
It is time to a take a more critical and consistent approach
to considering a defendant's nontestimonial demeanor-one
that considers the manner in which jurors actually decide cas-
es, which includes observations of actions that occur off the
witness stand.229 In constructing that approach, it is important
223. See United States v. Cook, 48 M.J. 64, 66-67 (C.A.A.F. 1998) (allowing
nonverbal communication to be considered evidence only when it is relevant
and can be fairly interpreted).
224. See Pearson, 746 F.2d at 796 (referring to the defendant's nervous leg
action during trial).
225. See id. at 66.
226. United States v. Carroll, 678 F.2d 1208, 1209-10 (4th Cir. 1982).
227. Id. at 1209. The court noted that the record was "devoid of any evi-
dence, aside from the prosecutor's assertion, that the defendant knew more
about the photographs [about which he consulted counsel] than did his law-
yer." Id. at 1210.
228. As Professor Imwinkelried notes, courts have not even been consistent
in how they have treated the demeanor of witnesses while they are not testify-
ing. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Demeanor Impeachment: Law and Tactics, 9
AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 183, 196-97 (1985) (stating that some courts allow jurors
to consider a witness's demeanor "in or about the courtroom").
229. See, e.g., David Landy & Elliot Aronson, The Influence of the Charac-
ter of the Criminal and His Victim on the Decisions of Simulated Jurors, 5 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 141, 146-51 (1969) (demonstrating the effect of
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to identify the arguments in favor and against jurors consider-
ing a defendant's nontestifying demeanor. The Cook court's ap-
proach may be a good compromise, but it may not give suffi-
cient guidance to future courts in dealing with the issue.
IV. THE DEFENDANT'S DEMEANOR AND THE ROLE OF
THE JURY: RESOLVING THE CONFLICT
As we have seen, certain realities must be accepted when
deciding how to deal with the issue of a jury's consideration of
the defendant's demeanor in the courtroom. First, how much
we allow a jury to consider the defendant's demeanor depends
on what decision-making roles we want to give to jurors. If ju-
rors have a limited role in evaluating evidence, it makes sense
to limit their use of nontestimonial information. In that case,
rather than allowing jurors to take ambiguous cues from a de-
fendant's demeanor, jurors should be routinely instructed not
to consider demeanor in their decisions. However, if we believe
that a defendant's demeanor can play a valid role in jurors' de-
cision-making, we should identify what aspects of a defendant's
demeanor can be considered and give jurors specific instruc-
tions as to how to consider that information in their delibera-
tions. By doing so, there is a greater chance that jurors will use
nontestimonial evidence in a fair and consistent manner.
A. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF INSTRUCTING JURORS TO
DISREGARD A DEFENDANT'S NONTESTIFYING DEMEANOR
There are several arguments in favor of simply instructing
jurors that a defendant's demeanor is irrelevant to their deci-
sions and must not be considered in their deliberations. As this
Section will discuss, jurors no longer serve as compurgators,
but are regulated by rules of evidence and procedure. Allowing
jurors to consider information no longer formally acknowledged
to be "evidence" may be seen as conflicting with our current ap-
proach to modern trials. There is also the concern that jurors
may not have the skills to properly evaluate nontestimonial
demeanor evidence and that allowing such evidence will change
the dynamic of the courtroom, diverting jurors' attention from
the evidence being presented on the witness stand. Additional-
the attractiveness of defendants and victims on simulated juries); Susanne
Shay, Effects of Defendant Character and Juror Authoritarianism on the Deci-
sion Making Process 20-29 (July 1987) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Tem-
ple University), microformed on GETINFO (Univ. Microforms Int'l) (analyzing
the effect of defendant attractiveness on jury decisions).
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ly, allowing such observations as evidence can also impact inte-
ractions between counsel and client, undermine rules on cha-
racter evidence, and impact a defendant's exercise of the Fifth
Amendment privilege not to testify. Finally, one must consider
what happens when the unspoken becomes spoken; that is, how
jurors will change their decision-making process once they are
told that nontestifying demeanor may be relevant. Each of
these concerns must be studied before any proposal is adopted
to govern the admissibility of nontestifying demeanor evidence.
The first argument against allowing a defendant's nontes-
tifying demeanor to play a role in trial is that there has been a
historical move from a trial system in which the defendant and
jurors interacted throughout the proceedings, to one in which a
defendant, unless testifying, is a mere observer of the proceed-
ings.230 When jury trials first began, jurors served as compur-
gators-individuals who were selected to sit as jurors because
they knew the defendant and could, as witnesses, offer opinions
regarding the defendant's credibility and law-abiding nature.231
As structured, it made sense for jurors to consider a defendant's
demeanor both in and out of the courtroom because the jurors
knew the defendant and could properly evaluate the meaning of
the defendant's reactions. However, as jury trials metamor-
phosed232 into formalized proceedings where jurors are outsid-
ers who must listen to the evidence and exclude everything ex-
cept what they have heard in open court from sworn witnesses,
allowing jurors to consider their perceptions of the defendant
was no longer reliable or consistent with the nature of forma-
lized proceedings in which the judge closely regulates what evi-
dence jurors may consider. There is little way for the court to
monitor and control such observations by jurors or for them to
be reviewed by appellate courts.
230. See LANGBEIN, supra note 35, at 253.
231. MOORE, supra note 32, at 40 (stating that, in the first jury trials, the
jurors were "witnesses summoned from the neighborhood").
232. The change was slow, and began with parties putting on their case but
with no distinction among pleadings, evidence, and argument. See id. at 56.
The criminal trial continued to change throughout the last four centuries, and
continues to evolve today. See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 6, at 43 (describing
the jury as being "in a process of continual evolution"); B. Michael Dann &
George Logan III, Jury Reform: The Arizona Experience, 79 JUDICATURE 280,
280-83 (1996) (describing possible jury reforms); B. Michael Dann, "Learning
Lessons" and "Speaking Rights" Creating Educated and Democratic Juries, 68
IND. L.J. 1229, 1247-79 (1993) (same); Valerie P. Hans, U.S. Jury Reform: The
Active Jury and the Adversarial Ideal, 21 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 85, 87-97
(2002) (same).
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Second, it is not at all clear that jurors are equipped to
properly evaluate the significance of a defendant's demeanor in
the courtroom. 233 Without subjecting the defendant to question-
ing, it may be impossible for lay observers to know whether a
defendant's reaction is genuine or staged.234 It is often difficult,
if not impossible, to tell from someone's facial expressions what
he or she is thinking or feeling. Certain individuals react to ter-
rible news with an inappropriate smile or joke; others sob when
they are overjoyed. A face of stone could be interpreted as un-
caring, when the individual is actually worried, frightened, or
distracted. 235 Defendants with mental disabilities may act in-
appropriately in court because of those disabilities. Defense
counsel may also instruct their client as to how to react or not
to react during the proceedings. 236 It is often nothing more than
mere speculation for jurors to guess what a defendant's demea-
nor means with regard to his mental state, consciousness of
guilt, or remorse. 237 Moreover, there is a high likelihood that
233. Studies indicate that jurors can easily misinterpret behavior in the
courtroom because of their expectations of how people are to act in the court-
room setting. See Searcy et al., supra note 14, at 42-45. If a defendant is una-
ware of those expectations, behavior that might be interpreted as humorous or
eccentric outside the courtroom may be viewed as inappropriate and inculpa-
tory inside the courtroom. Id. at 49-50. In a key study on how demeanor and
nonverbal communication affects jurors' decisions, Professor Michael Saks, a
professor of law and psychology, found that "demeanor cues often reduce accu-
racy in detecting deception, by distracting people into looking at cues they
think are associated with lying and overlooking cues that actually are.... Ap-
parently, facial cues provide little help and sometimes do more harm than
good." Michael J. Saks, What Do Jury Experiments Tell Us About How Juries
(Should) Make Decisions?, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 21 (1997).
234. Additionally, attractive people are seen as more honest than unattrac-
tive people, and symmetrical faces more honest than asymmetrical. See Denise
Mann, Born to Lie?, WEBMD, http://www.webmd.com/sex-relationships/
features/born-to-lie (last visited Nov. 25, 2007).
235. See Hughes v. State, 437 A.2d 559, 572 (Del. 1981) (commenting that
it may be "dangerous" to judge defendants based on the assumption that there
is a "model of 'normal' courtroom behavior"). Profound cultural differences
may also affect demeanor. See TEX. DEP'T OF FAMILY AND PROTECTIVE SERVS.,
APS FACILITY (AFC) INVESTIGATIONS HANDBOOK 4240 (1997), available at
http://www.dfps.state.tx.us/Handbooks/APSFacility/Files/AFC-pg-4200.asp
[hereinafter APS FACILITY INVESTIGATIONS HANDBOOK] (instructing investi-
gators that cultural differences may influence witness demeanor so that the
demeanor is no longer indicative of the witness's credibility).
236. See Richard C. Wydick, The Ethics of Witness Coaching, 17 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1, 5 (1995) (stating that one of the lawyer's tasks to perform while pre-
paring witnesses is discussing "effective courtroom demeanor" with them).
237. See, e.g., Hughes, 437 A.2d at 572 ("[T]he practice is pregnant with po-
tential prejudice. A guilty verdict must be based upon the evidence and the
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jurors mistakenly believe that they are more capable of inter-
preting demeanor in the courtroom than they have the right to
believe. 238 Because jurors are given license to use a witness's
demeanor in deciding that witness's credibility, 239 they may be
under the misimpression that they can bring the same observa-
tions to bear when analyzing the conduct of other persons in
the courtroom. Certainly, without instructions to tell them oth-
erwise, jurors may very well assume that they have the exper-
tise and life experience to accurately interpret a defendant's
behavior in the courtroom. 240
Third, openly sanctioning jurors' use of demeanor evidence
risks creating an atmosphere in the courtroom in which the
staging of the witness stand can overshadow the evidence pre-
sented by the witnesses. The ideal courtroom trial is calm and
dignified. While not every display of emotion will make a trial
unfair, 241 the goal is to have jurors decide the case from the
evidence and not in response to courtroom lobbying efforts. If
jurors are allowed to consider a party's demeanor, there is the
constant risk that lawyers will coach their clients on how to
communicate with jurors without testifying. 242
Fourth, other than when the defendant is testifying and it
is understood that the jurors should focus their attention on
him or her, there are no set times when jurors are told that
reasonable inferences therefrom, not on an irrational response which may be
triggered if the prosecution unfairly strikes an emotion in the jury.").
238. See Harrigan & Taing, supra note 48, at 216-18 (explaining that
smiles can express a range of emotions but that nontrained judges, and there-
fore likely nontrained jurors, usually interpret smiles "in the most traditional
manner").
239. See United States v. Schuler, 813 F.2d 978, 981 n.3 (9th Cir. 1987)
("When a defendant chooses to testify, a jury must necessarily consider the
credibility of the defendant. In this circumstance, courtroom demeanor has
been allowed as one factor to be taken into consideration.").
240. See United States v. Carroll, 678 F.2d 1208, 1210 (4th Cir. 1982) (in-
structing that even though the defendant pointed to crime scene pictures when
talking with his attorney and the prosecutor stated that this act showed that
the defendant knew the scene, the jury should disregard the defendant's act
and the prosecution's statement because both the defendant and his counsel
were given the picture prior to trial).
241. See, e.g., Carey v. Musladin, 127 S. Ct. 649, 650-51 (2006) (holding
that a murder trial where the victim's family wore buttons of the victim's pic-
ture did not deny the defendant the right to a fair trial).
242. Such coaching raises serious ethical issues, as it does when lawyers
coach their witnesses on their appearance and their delivery of testimony. See
Wydick, supra note 236, at 4-18 (stating that some coaching may be accepta-
ble because it lessens the likelihood that the witness's appearance or behavior
will harm a meritorious case).
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they should focus on the defendant's demeanor. Thus, the like-
lihood is that only a few of the decision makers will observe the
defendant at any particular time. There will not be a common
observation for the jurors to consider when they go into their
deliberations. One juror's quick glimpse of the defendant may
carry undue weight during the jurors' discussions. It will be ex-
tremely difficult for the trial and appellate courts to police the
use of demeanor evidence unless each glance or movement is
noted for the record. 243
Fifth, there are important policy grounds for discouraging
jurors from interpreting a defendant's activities and reactions
at counsel table. Generally, there is a policy to allow open and
honest communications between lawyers and their clients, es-
pecially during trial.244 Although counsel and client are in open
court, there is still an expectation that their communications
will remain privileged. 245 It is often difficult for counsel and
client to communicate during court because their communica-
tions are limited to whispers and notes passed to each other.
Jurors should be discouraged from scrutinizing a defendant
during trial so that there can be more open communication be-
tween clients and their lawyers.
Sixth, to the extent that jurors divine any information from
a defendant's demeanor, they are generally obtaining informa-
tion regarding the defendant's character. Under current evi-
dentiary rules, a defendant's guilt or innocence should not be
based upon a defendant's character.246 A defendant cannot be
243. See United States v. Cook, 48 M.J. 64, 65 n.1 (C.A.A.F. 1998) ("Unless
demeanor evidence is noted as part of the record, it will not appear in the trial
transcript.").
244. See Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Fixed Rules, Balancing, and
Constitutional Entitlement, 91 HARV. L. REV. 464, 469-70 (1977) (describing
that some believe that uninhibited attorney-client communication is an end in
itself, and that others believe that it is a mean by which to achieve fairness
and just disposition of cases); see also Carroll, 678 F.2d at 1210 (holding that it
was improper to infer that the defendant had been at the scene of the crime
because he seemed to know more about the photographs than his attorney,
when he was talking to his attorney at trial); United States v. Corona, 551
F.2d 1386, 1389 (5th Cir. 1977) (finding that it was improper to refer to the
defense counsel consulting with the defendant during trial in order to imply
the defendant's guilt).
245. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998) ("The
attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest recognized privileges for confiden-
tial communications.").
246. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a) ("Evidence of a person's character or a trait of
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity the-
rewith on a particular occasion .. "); 32 C.J.S Evidence § 507 (2007) (describ-
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convicted simply because he is a bad person. 247 Even if a defen-
dant is generally callous, mean, or antisocial, that cannot be
the basis for a criminal conviction. The focus must be on the de-
fendant's acts.248 Allowing jurors to use information that they
observe from a defendant's courtroom demeanor and to make
assumptions as to the defendant's character undermines a cru-
cial rule limiting the use of character evidence in criminal cas-
es.249 Jurors who perceive a defendant as lacking remorse are
making the assumption that he has committed acts for which
he should feel guilty. The focus of jurors should be on what a
defendant has done, not on whether the jurors like or dislike
the defendant. 250
Seventh, jurors should be told to disregard a defendant's
demeanor during trial because putting the defendant in the
spotlight operates contrary to a defendant's Fifth Amendment
ing that evidence of a specific act is not generally admissible to prove charac-
ter and stating that the Federal Rules of Evidence conform with this general
rule). Character evidence is excluded to "prevent confusion of issues, unfair
surprise and undue prejudice." Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 476
(1948). There are exceptions to this general rule for sex offenses, where cha-
racter and propensity evidence may play a much greater role. See FED. R. EV-
ID. 413-15 (setting forth that evidence of similar acts of sexual assault or child
molestation may be admitted in both civil and criminal cases).
247. See Joshua Dressler, Reflections on Excusing Wrongdoers: Moral
Theory, New Excuses and the Model Penal Code, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 671, 694-98
(1988) (suggesting that whether or not someone is a "bad person" is more rele-
vant during sentencing determination than when deciding whether the person
should be punished for committing a crime); see also Joel Schrag & Suzanne
Scotchmer, Crime and Prejudice: The Use of Character Evidence in Criminal
Trials, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 319, 321 (1994) ("Rule 404 addresses the fear
that a jury may believe that it is 'just' to convict a defendant on the basis of
'bad character' even if the rest of the evidence is weak."); H. Richard Uviller,
Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice in the
Courtroom, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 845, 848, 882-83 (1982) (describing the com-
monly held belief that people can predict the behavior of others by studying
their character but noting that this belief generally does not resonate with the
judicial system due to its prejudicial potential).
248. See LANGBEIN, supra note 35, at 191 (stating that the modern policy
behind excluding character evidence is that it pulls the jury's attention away
from the facts of the current case).
249. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a) (providing that character evidence is general-
ly not admissible to prove conformity with the alleged crime in the case at
hand).
250. See APS FACILITY INVESTIGATIONS HANDBOOK, supra note 235, at
4240 ("[E]ach investigator should be aware of his own potential bias."). Al-
though a defendant's character is generally not the central issue for a case, the
sentencing phase of a trial may be the exception. United States v. Schuler, 813
F.2d 978, 981 n.3 (9th Cir. 1987) ("At this stage different considerations, in-
cluding general character, are relevant.").
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privilege not to incriminate himself.251 A defendant has an ab-
solute constitutional right not to testify against himself in a
criminal proceeding. 252 Unless jurors are instructed to disre-
gard a defendant's reactions in court, these reactions may very
well be treated as "evidence" against the defendant and used by
the jury to convict him or her. In essence, even if a defendant
has decided not to testify, his or her demeanor and actions will
be construed as testimonial and will be used to incriminate him
or her.
Conversely, but also troubling, a defendant may be able to
tell the jury his story without being subject to cross-
examination. 253 Although a defendant has a Fifth Amendment
right not to testify, if he does seek to tell his story to the jury,
his credibility should be subject to the same critical examina-
tion as that of other witnesses. 25 4 If jurors are allowed to rely
on nontestimonial demeanor evidence, a defendant could alter
his demeanor in the courtroom in a way designed to convey in-
formation to the jurors that the defendant does not want to
present from the witness stand; on the witness stand the de-
fendant would be subject to cross-examination. 25 5
Finally, it is one thing to let the jury observe demeanor and
another to direct them that it is permissible to draw inferences
from it. The former may be unavoidable; 256 however, the latter
is not necessarily required. It is impractical to expect judges to
251. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall ... be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself .....
252. Id.
253. In addition to Fifth Amendment implications, use of demeanor evi-
dence may also raise Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause issues. See U.S.
CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to ... be confronted with the witnesses against him .... ). Generally, the
defendant has the right "to confront" evidence against him or her. Id. Al-
though a defendant's demeanor may be used against him or her in jury delibe-
rations, there is generally no specific opportunity for the defendant to confront
the inferences drawn from that demeanor.
254. See Reagan v. United States, 157 U.S. 301, 305 (1895) ("On the other
hand, if he avail himself of this privilege, his credibility may be impeached, his
testimony may be assailed, and is to be weighed as that of any other wit-
ness.").
255. See, e.g., Waller v. United States, 179 F. 810, 812-13 (8th Cir. 1910)
(stating that a defendant could pantomime insanity in front of the jury in or-
der to support an insanity defense, and therefore, if the defendant's behavior
can be used to support such a defense, then his behavior should be subject to
cross-examination).
256. See 2 WIGMORE, supra note 133, § 274(2), at 119-20 ("[T]he attempt to
force a jury to become mentally blind to the behavior of the accused sitting be-
fore them involves both an impossibility in practice and a fiction in theory.").
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observe all conduct of parties during trial, especially when they
must be concentrating on the witnesses and making rulings
during the proceedings. Unless a defendant's conduct is fla-
grant enough to command the attention of everyone in the
courthouse, there may be little basis for the judge to decide
whether it is proper to allow the jury to draw any inferences
from the defendant's alleged conduct in the courtroom.
Thus, there are strong policy and constitutional reasons to
instruct jurors to disregard a defendant's demeanor during tri-
al. If only "evidence" should be considered by jurors in their de-
liberations, defendant's reactions do not qualify, and jurors
should not be considering them. This is particularly the case if
jurors are likely to make false inferences based upon the de-
meanor they observe. It is not enough to give jurors only an af-
firmative instruction to consider only "evidence," because, as
experience has taught us, jurors nonetheless observe a defen-
dant's reactions in the courtroom. Jurors must be told to disre-
gard those observations and to rest their verdict only on evi-
dence from the witness stand.25 7 Since a defendant's reactions
are not evidence and, therefore, not part of the court record, it
should also be impermissible for lawyers to refer to them in ar-
gument.
B. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF ALLOWING DEMEANOR EVIDENCE
Despite the foregoing arguments against allowing jurors to
consider a defendant's demeanor in their deliberations, many
judges believe that a defendant's demeanor and conduct in the
courtroom are relevant and should be considered by jurors in
their deliberations. 258 The support for this approach is both his-
torical and practical. It is historical because of the evolution of
the jury process from one in which the defendant played a more
active role than the defendant does today. It is practical be-
cause the reality is that jurors are free at any time to look over
at the defendant sitting in the courtroom and make judgments
based upon their observations.
First, as we have seen, historically there was no problem
with jurors considering a defendant's demeanor because the
257. See Waller, 179 F. at 812 ("It is, therefore, better that jurymen should
have the aid of counsel and the supervision of the court in interpreting such
evidence rather than be left to their own unguided impressions.").
258. See id. ("The demeanor of the defendant is not only proper evidence,
but it is impossible to prevent the jury from observing and being influenced by
it.").
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courtroom was a venue where the jury had the general respon-
sibility of assessing a defendant's character and deciding on the
just result for the case. 259 Although trials have become more
formal, there is still an interest in ensuring that jurors reach a
moral conviction that a defendant should or should not be held
accountable for a crime. 260 For many years, jury instructions
defining proof beyond a reasonable doubt frequently referred to
proof to "a moral certainty."261 Faced with an inability to quan-
tify to a mathematical or scientific certainty the proof needed to
convict a defendant, instructions would ask jurors to decide
whether they were satisfied to a moral certainty as reasonable
human beings that a guilty verdict was justified.262 Sometimes
the test of the sufficiency of the evidence was phrased in terms
of whether the circumstances proved "produce a moral convic-
tion to the exclusion of every reasonable doubt."263 The lan-
guage of the instruction reminded jurors that they were mak-
ing a moral judgment as to whether a defendant should be
convicted.
259. See, e.g., LANGBEIN, supra note 35, at 190-96 (examining the promi-
nent role of character evidence in assessing the defendant's guilt in seven-
teenth-century criminal trials in England).
260. See generally Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience
of Retribution as an Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1313, 1313-18 (2000) (explaining the various articulated pur-
poses of criminal punishment, and discussing "the restoration of retribution as
an essential purpose of punishment"); see also Peter Arenella, Convicting the
Morally Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship Between Legal and Moral Ac-
countability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1511, 1527 (1992) ("[C]riminal convictions for
serious nonregulatory offenses convey the message that the offender was mo-
rally responsible for his crime and thus deserves moral blame for what he has
done."); Eric A. DeGroff, The Application of Strict Criminal Liablity to Mari-
time Oil Pollution Incidents: Is There OPA for the Accidental Spiller?, 50 LOY.
L. REV. 827, 839 (2004) ("The emphasis on the moral character of the defen-
dant's act and the wrongful state of his mind has long been understood to be
an essential characteristic of the criminal law .... [T]he criminal law has his-
torically been distinguished from its civil counterpart by virtue of the criminal
law's role in moral education and its focus on sanctioning blameworthy con-
duct.").
261. See, e.g., United States v. Indorato, 628 F.2d 711, 720 n.7 (1st Cir.
1980) (explaining that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard did not require
absolute certainty, "[o]nly to a moral certainty").
262. See id. ("So if you are satisfied to a reasonable certainty, that you, as
reasonable moral human beings, believe that the facts have been established
by the evidence, then you are under oath to bring back a verdict of guilty.").
263. See, e.g., Ruffin v. State, 513 So. 2d 63, 66 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987)
(quoting Cumbo v. State, 368 So. 2d 871, 875 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978)).
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Although language referring to "moral certainty" is prob-
lematic because it is ambiguous, 264 the Supreme Court has re-
fused to hold that its use necessarily violates a defendant's due
process rights. 265 Moreover, the historical roots of the phrase
suggest that the goal was to have jurors focus on all of the cir-
cumstances of a case to decide based upon the highest degree of
certainty that the defendant deserved to be punished. 266 The
1979 Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary defined
"moral evidence" as evidence "based on general observation of
people." 267 A historical and ongoing role of trials is to allow ju-
rors to observe the evidence and the defendant in assessing the
guilt of a defendant. 268
Additionally, the criminal justice system recognizes that
jurors may sometimes look beyond the evidence in making their
decisions. 269 Accordingly, we allow jurors to reach decisions
contrary to the evidence, such as when jurors engage in jury
nullification. 2 70 We also accept inconsistent verdicts from ju-
264. See e.g., Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 39 (1990) (per curiam) (hold-
ing that the phrase "moral certainty" was inadequate and misleading to de-
scribe the level of proof required by the beyond a reasonable doubt standard,
and that use of the phrase by itself violates the Due Process Clause).
265. See, e.g., Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 1-2 (1994) (stating that the
use of moral certainty did not necessarily mean that the jury considered a
lower level of proof than required by the beyond a reasonable doubt standard).
266. Id. at 11-12 ("[P]roof to a moral certainty is an equivalent phrase with
beyond a reasonable doubt." (quoting Fid. Mut. Life Ass'n v. Mettler, 185 U.S.
308, 317 (1902)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
267. Compare WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY 1168 (2d
ed. 1979), with BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 598 (8th ed. 2004) ("[Moral evi-
dence:] [l]oosely, evidence that depends on a belief, rather than complete and
absolute proof.").
268. See Todd E. Pettys, Evidentiary Relevance, Morally Reasonable Ver-
dicts, and Jury Nullification, 86 IOWA L. REV. 467, 471 (2001) (stating that
evidence and the way that it is presented allows the defendant to convince the
jury "that a guilty verdict would be morally reasonable").
269. See Arie M. Rubenstein, Verdicts of Conscience: Nullification and the
Modern Jury Trial, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 959, 960-62 (2006) (describing jury
nullification, which refers to when the evidence supports that the defendant is
guilty but the jury still acquits); see also Anne Bowen Poulin, The Jury: The
Criminal Justice System's Different Voice, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1377, 1399 (1994)
(describing jury nullification as the jury's "power to acquit or to convict on re-
duced charges despite overwhelming evidence against the defendant").
270. See Irwin A. Horowitz et al., Jury Nullification: Legal and Psycholog-
ical Perspectives, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1207, 1208-11 (2001) (noting that courts
do not "sanction the nullification power of the jury, but [judges] tacitly recog-
nize the jury's right to nullify" verdicts based upon their own observations,
moral values, and intent). By jury nullification, jurors may accept both the
crime in theory, and the punishment that attaches to it, but maintain that
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rors.271 The dynamic of the modern courtroom, although more
structured from its historical roots, still recognizes that even
though jurors are directed to make their evaluations based
upon the formal evidence presented at trial, there are other va-
riables and observations that continue to influence their deci-
sions.
Second, allowing jurors to use nontestimonial demeanor
evidence makes sense because it is impractical to believe that
jurors will be able to disregard their impressions of the defen-
dant as developed from their observations in the courtroom,
even if they are instructed to do so. Some psychologists esti-
mate that people get as much as ninety percent of their infor-
mation from nonverbal cues. 272 Try as we might to compart-
mentalize evidence in trial, jurors adjudge cases based upon
inferences and subjective evaluations of the proceedings. 273 In-
structing jurors not to consider a defendant's demeanor evi-
dence would merely push to the subconscious level information
that jurors will nonetheless consider when they decide whether
to vote guilty or not guilty.2 74 Moreover, such an instruction
neither fit the particular defendant that they are asked to judge. FINKEL, su-
pra note 20, at 33 (providing an excellent history of jury nullification and stat-
ing that jurors may decide that a crime merits punishment just not in the case
at hand).
271. Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393-94 (1932) (stating that a
consistent verdict is unnecessary because there are legitimate reasons why
inconsistency may occur).
272. James William Neuliep, The Nonverbal Code, in INTERCULTURAL
COMMUNICATION: A CONTEXTUAL APPROACH 285, 287 (3d ed. 2006), available
at http://www.sagepub.co.uk/upm-data/11826_Chapter8.pdf.
273. In fact, some philosophers opine that our very sense of justice begins
with our emotions. See ROBERT C. SOLOMON, A PASSION FOR JUSTICE: EMO.
TIONS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 203-08 (1990) (discussing
the historical roots of the moral sentiment theory). Moral sentiments guide
jurors in their judgments:
We evaluate a real person's behavior as just or unjust on the basis of
particular motives and actions along with his or her general charac-
ter, and among the crucial ingredients in that amalgam of motives,
actions, and character are the moral sentiments and what we might
more generally call moral sensibilities.
Id. at 203. Given this natural inclination, it is unlikely that jurors will com-
pletely disregard their emotional assessment of the defendant made from their
firsthand observations. So long as jurors are able to perceive the defendant,
they will make judgments, especially if they are not warned or directed as to
how to deal with those perceptions Judicial Council of California Criminal
Jury Instructions [CALCRIM] No. 104 (2007).
274. SMITH & MALANDRO, supra note 4, § 4.06, at 349-50 ("People make
decisions by emotion (unconscious mind) and validate them with logic (con-
scious mind)."). Thus, jurors anchor their perceptions of the evidence through
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works contrary to other instructions that tell jurors to use their
common sense and life experience in deciding a case. 275
Third, with proper instructions, jurors will be able to give
demeanor evidence the weight, if any, that it deserves. 276 Thus,
if jurors see a defendant try to intimidate a witness through
menacing gestures, they should be able to consider those ac-
tions in deciding a defendant's consciousness of guilt. Even
those courts that generally disfavor the use of nontestimonial
demeanor evidence are willing to allow jurors to consider
threatening actions of the defendant that demonstrate con-
sciousness of guilt.277 Jurors are capable of distinguishing be-
tween innocuous behavior and that which is relevant to their
understanding of the facts of a case. Generally, no specific ex-
pertise is needed to read a person's behavior. 278 Moreover,
where such expertise is needed, it can be provided to jurors
through expert testimony or jury instructions. With the proper
tools and guidance, jurors should be able to properly under-
stand demeanor information and use it in their decisionmak-
ing.279
the lens of what they have observed overall in the courtroom, including their
observations of the defendant's behavior.
275. See, e.g., Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instructions
[CALCRIM] No. 226 (2007), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/jury/
criminaljuryinstructions/calcrimjuryins.pdf (instructing that jurors must use
their "common sense and experience" in deciding whether to believe a piece of
testimony).
276. Waller v. United States, 179 F. 810, 812 (8th Cir. 1910) (stating that
jurors will inevitably judge the defendant's demeanor; therefore, the counsel
and judge should instruct them as to how to use that information).
277. See, e.g., United States v. Cook, 48 M.J. 64, 66 (C.A.A.F. 1998) (ar-
guing that courts have allowed intimidating acts by defendant to show con-
sciousness of guilt); United States v. Maddox, 944 F.2d 1223, 1226, 1230 (6th
Cir. 1991) (arguing that the defendant's act of mouthing the words "you're
dead" to the witness was probative of consciousness of guilt); United States v.
Mickens, 926 F.2d 1323, 1328-29 (2d Cir. 1991) (allowing admission of threat
evidence when the defendant made a hand gesture in the shape of gun to in-
timidate the witness).
278. FED. R. EVID. 607 (allowing opinion and reputation testimony by lay
witnesses to impeach the credibility of other witnesses).
279. This argument depends, in part, on whether judges will be willing to
allow expert testimony on demeanor. Courts have broad discretion in deciding
whether to admit expert testimony in general. Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591-98 (1993) (discussing the broad considera-
tions of "fit" when determining the relevance of expert testimony). Judges par-
ticularly resist admitting evidence that is similar to analysis of witness de-
meanor, such as expert testimony regarding eyewitness testimony. If jurors
are allowed to consider nontestifying demeanor evidence, there is no guaran-
tee that jurors will be provided expert testimony to assist them in this analy-
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Fourth, the fact that the parties can manipulate demeanor
evidence should not determine whether such information
should be barred. It is well recognized that lawyers can mani-
pulate jurors through the way that witnesses are dressed or
taught to speak. 280 Jurors are capable of understanding that a
defendant will likely fake his reactions in court. 281 No special
expertise is needed, and, to the extent that it is, the parties
should be allowed to argue the issue or present expert wit-
nesses regarding demeanor. This is particularly the case where
there is evidence that a defendant has been coached or medi-
cated to make a specific impression on the jury.
Fifth, concerns about possible violations of a defendant's
Fifth Amendment rights do not provide a compelling reason to
bar the use of nontestimonial demeanor evidence. 28 2 In order
for there to be a Fifth Amendment violation, a defendant must
sis. For more information regarding the admissibility of eyewitness expert tes-
timony, see Henry F. Fradella, Why Judges Should Admit Expert Testimony
on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Testimony, 2006 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 23-29,
available at http://www.fclr.org/docs/2006fedctslrev3.pdf ("Courts have incon-
sistently admitted expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identifica-
tions."); Robert P. Murrian, The Admissibility of Expert Eyewitness Testimony
Under the Federal Rules, 29 CUMB. L. REV. 379, 386-95 (1999) (discussing the
relevance of this testimony); Jennifer L. Overbeck, Beyond Admissibility: A
Practical Look at the Use of Eyewitness Expert Testimony in the Federal
Courts, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1895, 1908-12 (2005) (discussing the historical de-
velopment of eyewitness expert testimony); Scott Woller, Rethinking the Role
of Expert Testimony Regarding the Reliability of Eyewitness Identifications in
New York, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 323, 327-33, 338-47 (2003) (describing the
growing acceptance of expert eyewitness testimony and arguing for the liberal
admission thereof); Margaret J. Lane, Comment, Eyewitness Identification:
Should Psychologists Be Permitted to Address the Jury?, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRI-
MINOLOGY 1321, 1333-39 (1984) (describing the common substance of such
testimony); Andrew R. Tillman, Comment, Expert Testimony on Eyewitness
Identification: The Constitution Says, "Let the Expert Speak," 56 TENN. L. REV.
735, 760-74 (1989) (describing the constitutional considerations for determin-
ing the admissibility of eyewitness expert testimony); Christopher M. Walters,
Comment, Admission of Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification, 73
CAL. L. REV. 1402, 1403-06 (1985) (describing the case for expert testimony).
280. See Gold, supra note 3, at 484-91.
281. See SMITH & MALANDRO, supra note 4, § 1.47, at 85 (outlining six
principles for understanding impression formation).
282. People v. Edelbacher, 766 P.2d 1, 30 (Cal. 1989) ("Comment on a de-
fendant's demeanor as a witness is clearly proper and comment on courtroom
demeanor may be proper under some circumstances."). But cf. United States v.
Schuler, 813 F.2d 978, 981 (9th Cir. 1987) ('That the jury witnesses the court-
room behavior [of the defendant] ... does not make it proper for the prosecutor
to tell them, with the court's approval, that they may consider it as evidence of
guilt." (quoting United States v. Wright, 489 F.2d 1181, 1186 (D.C. Cir.
1973))).
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be compelled to provide testimony against himself.28 3 A defen-
dant's actions and reactions in court are not compelled. Moreo-
ver, even though the definition of "testimonial" is very much up
in the air these days, 28 4 the term generally requires a defen-
dant to discuss an event in a more formalized manner. Reac-
tions, facial expressions, and demeanor-which are not elicited
through interrogation-are generally not considered to be tes-
timonial. Thus, it is unlikely that a defendant's reactions in
court would be considered "compelled testimony." 28 5
Finally, the most persuasive reason to allow a defendant's
demeanor to be considered by a jury is the argument that the
theater of the courtroom matters. In other words, although
there are rules of evidence, trials have not become and should
not become so regimented that the natural dynamic of the cour-
troom is lost. There is an uncalculated value in having jurors
use information that is not formally "evidence" in their decision
making. When the public evaluates the legitimacy of a verdict,
it will focus on the individual on trial-including that person's
behavior-as well as how the prosecution proves its case. 28 6
283. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
284. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-53 (2004) (noting that mul-
tiple formulations of the term "testimonial" exist, from affidavits to out-of-
court statements made under circumstances where the witness would reason-
ably believe that the statement could be used at trial).
285. To the extent that a defendant's demeanor is viewed as testimonial, it
certainly is not "compelled."
286. An example of the impact and role of the theater of the courtroom is
the Chicago Eight conspiracy case. See JANICE SCHUETZ & KATHRYN HOLMES
SNEDAKER, COMMUNICATION AND LITIGATION: CASE STUDIES OF FAMOUS TRI-
ALS 217 (1988) (describing the trial of the Chicago Eight as a "burlesque dra-
ma" where the satirical drama of the courtroom had as much or more of an
impact than the actual evidence presented at trial). In that trial, eight radical
dissidents were put on trial for conspiracy to cross state lines to cause a riot.
Id. at 218-19. The trial became a political showcase. Id. at 217. Even more
important than the evidence from the witness stand were the actions of the
defendants during trial. See id. at 223. The defendants frequently and delibe-
rately interrupted the proceedings with outbursts of profanity. See id. at 227-
28. Whenever a government witness would point at the defendants, the defen-
dants would make "oink, oink" sounds from their chairs. Id. at 228. The prose-
cutors asked the court to admonish the defendants to stop laughing during the
case because the laughter was giving the jury the impression that the trial
was absurd. Id at 237. To convey their disdain for the court, defendants ap-
peared unshaved, with long hair, wearing peace symbols, beads and black
armbands. Id. They sat on the floor and used vulgar gestures, such as raising
their middle fingers or plugging their ears with their fingers to disparage the
prosecution's case. Id.
In the end, the jurors were asked to decide whether the defendants were
illegal protestors. See id. at 245. To make that determination, they needed to
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Thus, the verdict should reflect the jurors' evaluation of the
evidence, as it makes sense in light of what they have observed
firsthand about the person they have been asked to judge.
Courtrooms are not laboratories; they are halls of judgment
where "[j]urors confront a real, live defendant and real-life con-
sequences." 287
If one accepts the arguments in favor of allowing jurors to
openly consider the dynamics of the courtroom, including the
defendant's demeanor or action, then there should not be an
absolute bar to the use of nontestimonial demeanor evidence.
However, there is still the concern that such information will
be used in a haphazard manner. Accordingly, to ensure that ju-
rors use such information in a manner that makes verdicts
more accurate, jury instructions should be fashioned that ex-
plain to the jurors how to critically evaluate such evidence and
what its role should be in their deliberations.
C. A COMPROMISE SOLUTION
Given the arguments for and against the use of demeanor
evidence, it is not surprising that the courts are split in how
they address the issue. But, there may be a better approach
than never allowing demeanor evidence or always allowing it.
One such solution would be to limit the manner in which
demeanor evidence may be considered and to instruct jurors ac-
cordingly. As with character evidence, demeanor evidence
should be used sparingly. In most cases, jurors should be in-
structed that a defendant's demeanor is generally not consi-
dered to be evidence because there is no way to test the validity
of a defendant's reactions. Especially in cases such as death
penalty and commitment cases, where jurors must make find-
ings regarding a defendant's character, they should be cau-
tioned not to infer conclusions from the defendant's appearance
absorb and consider the full milieu of the trial. As experts note, "although ju-
rors forget much of the content of the trial discourse, they recall general im-
pressions and attitudes that then enter into their decisions." Id. at 235. The
defendants' demeanor and actions in the Chicago Eight case partially worked
by getting the jurors to exonerate all of the defendants on charges of conspira-
cy, and later leading to an appellate reversal for those defendants convicted of
crossing state lines with intent to riot. Id. at 245. In the end, the trial was not
simply about what the defendants had done in Chicago that summer. Rather,
the burlesque of the courtroom succeeded in persuading a broader audience-
that of the community-of a higher truth. See id. at 245-46. To the extent that
trials are an opportunity for society to judge itself and its standards for justice,
then the full drama of the courtroom may be needed to make such a judgment.
287. FINKEL, supra note 20, at 39.
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and conduct in the courtroom. Rather, the jurors should keep
their attention directed on the evidence coming from the wit-
ness stand and should not speculate as to the meaning of the
defendant's demeanor.
However, in rare cases where a defendant's reactions dem-
onstrate consciousness of guilt, the prosecution should have an
opportunity to formalize this evidence and have it presented to
the jury. One way to do this is to have a witness to the conduct
testify during the proceedings and be subject to cross-
examination by defense counsel who could elicit the innocuous
or innocent explanations for the defendant's behavior. With
this approach, all of the jurors are getting the same information
and are obtaining it without turning their attention from what
is being presented on the witness stand. Moreover, this ap-
proach puts the defendant on notice as to how the prosecution
plans to use his or her conduct in the courtroom. The defen-
dant, directly or through counsel, has an opportunity to address
whether it is fair and accurate to derive any inferences from
that conduct.
Although jurors can ignore jury instructions, there is still a
value in giving these instructions. Jury instructions educate
the jurors on how to use the information they perceive in the
courtroom. Instructions not only communicate the rules of law,
but also the rules of jury behavior. 288 Jurors have no reason to
believe that they should not take into account a defendant's
sobs, laughter, or rolling of the eyes in reaching their verdict.
Instructions that address the relevance and irrelevance of such
conduct can help direct the discussion of jurors as they reach
their verdicts. 28 9
Admittedly, drafting such an instruction is not easy. Draft-
ing effective jury instructions is a daunting task,290 let alone
288. See Anne Bowen Poulin, The Jury: The Criminal Justice System's Dif-
ferent Voice, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1377, 1411 (1994).
289. For example, an instruction could read:
In determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant, you are cau-
tioned against relying on the defendant's demeanor while not testify-
ing. People react to stress or surprise in different ways. Some may
cry, others may laugh, still others may not react at all. Although you
are expected to incorporate your life experiences into your considera-
tion of the case presented, including the demeanor of witnesses on the
stand, guilt or innocence should be determined based on the evidence
presented.
290. For an understanding of the challenges of drafting effective and prop-
er jury instructions, see generally PETER M. TIERSMA, LEGAL LANGUAGE
(1999), and Nancy S. Marder, Bringing Jury Instructions in the Twenty-First
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drafting instructions that must direct jurors in how to consider
information that does not come in the form of traditional evi-
dence. However, the following language may be helpful:
Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury, you must decide this case based
upon all of the evidence presented in this case. In deciding the credi-
bility of a witness, you may consider that witness's demeanor on the
witness stand. Conduct that occurs in the courtroom, but not while a
person is on the witness stand, is not considered evidence unless you
have been specifically instructed to consider it by the court. This in-
cludes the conduct and demeanor of any of the parties, counsel, the
court, and even courtroom spectators.291
In those cases in which the court has decided that a defen-
dant's conduct may be considered as evidence, the following in-
struction should be added:292
In this case, [the prosecution or defense] has given notice293 that it
plans to argue that you should draw inferences from the defendant's
behavior in the courtroom. It is completely up to you what inferences
you draw from the defendant's conduct. Before drawing any such infe-
rences, you should consider (1) whether such conduct was intentional
and intended to convey information relevant to an issue in this case,
such as the defendant's intent; (2) any innocent explanations for the
defendant's behavior; and (3) the context in which the conduct oc-
curred. You are not to consider or speculate about any communica-
tions between the defendant and his or her counsel, nor should you
draw any inferences from a defendant's decision not to testify in this
case.
294
Century, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 449 (2006).
291. Although this Article has discussed the possible impact of spectator
conduct, it does not advocate allowing jurors to draw inferences from such
conduct. Most likely, the defendant did not have control over such actions and
to allow inferences from such conduct would be to encourage distractions dur-
ing trial.
292. This instruction may be given as a separate instruction or added to
preexisting instructions defining the nature of "evidence" in a case. Some in-
structions already inform jurors to disregard anything that they see or hear
when the court is not in session. See Judicial Council of California Criminal
Jury Instructions [CALCRIM] No. 104 (2007), available at http://www
.courtinfo.ca.gov/jury/criminaljuryinstructions/calcrimjuryins.pdf. If demea-
nor is going to be considered as evidence, this would be an appropriate place to
explain its use.
293. As with evidence of other acts under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b),
notice should be required before a party can refer to nontestifying demeanor
evidence in argument. By requiring notice, the court can better ensure that
disputes about what occurred in the courtroom are clarified for the record and
that the defendant had an opportunity to explain, either personally or through
another witness, what that conduct reflected.
294. Presumably, in cases in which the defendant testifies, there will be an
opportunity to examine and cross-examine the defendant regarding the mean-
ing of any conduct in the courtroom.
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Some courts might choose to be even more cautious in the
giving of such an instruction by identifying for the jurors specif-
ic problems with drawing inferences from demeanor evidence.
The instruction may be tailored for cases where the risks of mi-
sinterpretation are particularly high, such as when the defen-
dant comes from a different culture.
Additionally, if a jury is to consider a defendant's cour-
troom demeanor, there may be a need to clarify the definition of
"relevant" evidence in evidence codes. For example, Federal
Rule of Evidence 401 defines "relevant evidence" as "evidence
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable
or less probable than it would be without the evidence."29 5 The
rule does not address whether demeanor of a courtroom partic-
ipant may be considered as evidence.
In order to ensure that such information may be considered
in limited situations by the jury, it may be necessary to clarify
specifically what qualifies as evidence in a case. The definition
of "relevant" evidence could be modified to state that courtroom
demeanor can be considered as evidence only when specifically
noted on the record by the parties and the court. Otherwise, ju-
rors are to ignore such observations because they do not consti-
tute evidence. While it may be difficult for jurors to ignore what
they have observed, they will at least have some judicial guid-
ance as to what observations may be fairly used in their delibe-
rations.
CONCLUSION
Despite all of the rules of evidence and procedure, the cour-
troom is still a theater. The leading role belongs to the defen-
dant, yet jurors are expected to ignore their star throughout the
proceedings. We need to either counter jurors' natural inclina-
tions to base their judgments, in part, on their assessments of
the defendant, or we need to control how they consider such in-
formation.
We may be reluctant to tell jurors to ignore the defendant
altogether because we value a dynamic in which the community
literally faces the accused. This dynamic goes beyond the Con-
frontation Clause right of having the accused face his accus-
er.296 Rather, it includes the historical notion that a trial is so-
295. FED. R. EVID. 401.
296. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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ciety's way of resolving disputes between the defendant and the
overall community. Since this dynamic is valuable, the best ap-
proach is to try to regulate how jurors use their perceptions.
Jury instructions and witnesses who will testify regarding de-
meanor are tools available to do so.
The need to analyze how we are going to treat a defen-
dant's demeanor in the courtroom is particularly great at this
time when courts, legislatures, and the executive branch are
returning to basic questions of how criminal trials should be
presented. 297 The right of the defendant to be present in the
courtroom is important because it gives the defendant the op-
portunity to confront witnesses against him or her. But, sys-
temically this right does more. It ensures that the courtroom is
a place of judgment where the focus is on an individual and not
just an obscure set of facts.298
The goal is to focus on the defendant, as well as the facts of
the case, without allowing the defendant's actions to mislead
the jury. To accomplish this goal, standards and model jury in-
structions are needed. For jurors, there is nothing intuitive
about ignoring the star of the show. Pretending that jurors do
not consider a defendant's demeanor is akin to pretending that
jurors do not engage in jury nullification. 299 Just as courts have
authorized instructions regarding jury nullification, 300 they
297. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2797-98 (2006), the United
States Supreme Court held that the procedural rights accorded to enemy com-
batant Hamdan were not in accordance with international standards or the
standards required by civilized peoples, and the deviation from acceptable pro-
cedures was not justified by a compelling need.
298. In this regard, it is interesting to note that many jurisdictions do not
allow a defendant to waive his appearance for trial in capital cases. See, e.g.,
FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(c)(1)(B). Part of the reason for not allowing such waivers in
capital cases is that the process of judging the life and death of the defendant
involves a dynamic that requires the juror's direct observations of the defen-
dant, including his demeanor.
299. Or, as stated by advocates of clear instructions regarding jury nullifi-
cation, "[t]he current practice .. .has been analogized to 'telling jurors to
watch a baseball game and to determine who won without telling them the
rules until the game is over."' Lawrence W. Crispo et al., Jury Nullification:
Law Versus Anarchy, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 57 (1997) (quoting Albert W. Al-
schuler, Our Faltering Jury, 122 PUB. INT. 28, 36-37 (1996)).
300. See Bradley J. Huestis, Jury Nullification: Calling for Candor from
the Bench and Bar, 173 MIL. L. REV. 68, 106 (2002) ("The best solution to ad-
dress the jury nullification dilemma is a tightly worded, restrictive pattern in-
struction."); see also Pettys, supra note 268, at 529-30 (2001) (arguing that out
of respect and fairness to jurors, jury instructions should be given to alert ju-
rors to the court's perspective on whether jury nullification should be used);
Douglas E. Litowitz, Jury Nullification: Setting Reasonable Limits, CBA REC.
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should also give jury instructions regarding the proper consid-
eration of a defendant's demeanor in the courtroom.
The dynamics of criminal courts change constantly. If we
accept that it is unrealistic to consider courtrooms as mere la-
boratories where strict formulas regarding the processing of in-
formation will be obeyed by jurors, then we need to be realistic
as to how we deal with the theater of the courtroom. Demeanor
evidence of nontestifying parties is the new frontier. Like all
frontiers, it poses its risks. However, it also has its rewards.
Demeanor evidence can infuse emotive due process into our ad-
versary system30 1 by guiding decision makers in how to use
their subjective assessments of a defendant's character in de-
termining a case. Jurors are already naturally engaging in this
process. The best protection against them misusing this infor-
mation is to develop consistent and principled rules and in-
structions governing the use of nontestifying demeanor evi-
dence.
(Chi., Ill.), Sept. 1997, at 16 (advocating that jurors should be informed about
power to nullify, but informed in such a way that minimizes their tendencies
to do so).
301. See Samuel H. Pillsbury, A Problem in Emotive Due Process: Califor-
nia's Three Strikes Law, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 483, 499 (2002).
633
